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ABSTRACT
We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to
sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral
bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice
between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition
is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to
illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free
trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the
model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In
particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade
agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is
attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis
identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.
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One of the most debated issues in international economics is whether regionalism or multilat-
eralism is the most eﬀective strategy for achieving global free trade. According to Bhagwati
(1993), the ﬁrst wave of regionalism took place in the 1960s, and it failed to spread because
the U.S. supported a multilateral approach. But the U.S. changed positions, and – starting
with the 1980s – has favored regional trade agreements. This led to a second wave of region-
alism, which brought about a multitude of such agreements. The gradual enlargement of the
European Union, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA and MERCOSUR, are
examples of this trend. Between 1958 and March 2004, the GATT/WTO secretariat received
notiﬁcation of 203 agreements.1 The recent stalling of the Doha round further suggests that
multilateralism, which was the dominant force towards free trade in the ﬁrst few decades
after World War II, is falling out of fashion.
Economists disagree on whether preferential trade agreements are “building blocs” that
facilitate the attainment of global free trade, or “stumbling blocs” that derail the process of
trade liberalization. The latter view has been forcefully promoted by Bhagwati (1991, 1993),
who coined these terms.2 In this view, even when preferential trade agreements generate static
welfare gains they reduce the incentives to seek further trade liberalization. The importance
of this “dynamic path” question was clearly laid out by Bhagwati (1993) and Krugman (1993).
The latter also showed that in some circumstances welfare reaches a minimum when the world
consists of two or three customs unions.3 The welfare consequences of stalled multilateralism,
caused by the rise of regionalism, could therefore be signiﬁcant.
Other economists, such as Summers (1991), think that preferential trade agreements
do not impede global free trade. They argue that partial trade liberalization is better than
none, and that the consolidation of a large number of countries into a small number of trading
blocs facilitates multilateral negotiations. And Baldwin (1996) argues that a deepening of
integration between a subset of countries may raise the incentives of outside countries to seek
accession to the free trade area. Under these circumstances preferential trade agreements
encourage further trade liberalization and the expansion of the free trading blocs.4
1Many preferential trade agreements are not regional. The U.S.-Israel free trade agreement is a notable
example. Following Bhagwati (1993, p. 22), we use a terminology in which ‘regionalism’ is “...deﬁned broadly
as preferential trade agreements among a subset of nations.” That is, we downplay the geographical nature
of preferential trade agreements and emphasize instead the fact that they constitute an agreement between a
subset of countries.
2See Panagariya (2000) for a recent survey of this literature.
3See Deardorﬀ and Stern (1994), Bond and Syropoulos (1996), and Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996) for an
analysis of this issue in alternative economic frameworks.
4Furthermore, if an existing trading bloc follows a policy of “open” regionalism, by which accession is
sequentially granted to all countries that demand it, this sequential process is likely to lead to worldwide free
trade. See Yi (1996) for a discussion of “open” versus “closed” regionalism. In complementary work, Ethier
(1998) presents a model in which multilateral liberalization among a subset of developed countries raises
the incentives of outside (less developed) countries to seek preferential free trade agreements with particular
1Another way to pose the question of regionalism versus multilateralism is to ask whether
multilateral bargaining or sequential bargainin ga r em o r el i k e l yt ol e a dt og l o b a lf r e et r a d e .
In multilateral bargaining all countries simultaneously participate in a single round of trade
negotiations. In sequential bargaining negotiators proceed through several rounds, with dif-
ferent subsets of countries participating at diﬀerent stages of the process. In this paper we
compare these two negotiation strategies. Since trade negotiations involve bargaining, we
believe that it is important to address these issues in a framework that fully speciﬁes the
bargaining process.5
We develop a dynamic bargaining model of coalition formation, where a coalition consists
of a preferential trade agreement. A leading country decides endogenously whether to nego-
tiate sequentially with only a subset of countries or simultaneously with all countries. If the
leading country chooses the sequential path, it also has to decide which follower countries to
approach ﬁrst, which second, and so on. We follow Bhagwati (1993) in adopting the view
that the U.S. has been the leading country in the post—World War II period, and that it
has disproportionately aﬀected the process of trade liberalization. For this reason we model
the bargaining game as a game in which one country, the leader, has special agenda-setting
power.
In Section 2 we develop a simple transferable-utility game between three countries. One
of the countries is the leader with agenda-setting power. In the ﬁrst stage the leader decides
to negotiate multilaterally or sequentially. If it chooses multilateral bargaining, the leader
makes a simultaneous oﬀer to form a coalition with the two follower countries. If it chooses
the sequential path, the leader also decides which follower country to approach ﬁrst. At each
stage of the game the agenda-setter makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. This bargaining game
allows us to identify the payoﬀ of every coalition as a function of the coalition structure,
i.e., the value function, and this mapping allows us then to characterize the solution to the
bargaining game.
We ﬁrst take the value function as given, and deﬁne two properties of this function that
play a central role in the subsequent analysis: coalition externalities and grand-coalition
superadditivity. A coalition is subject to coalition externalities when its payoﬀ depends on
which other coalitions form. In the simple three-country setup, this means that coalition
externalities emerge whenever the size of a country’s payoﬀ depends on whether the other
two countries form a coalition or not. Payoﬀs exhibit grand-coalition superadditivity when the
payoﬀ of the grand coalition is larger than the payoﬀ of all countries combined in alternative
coalition structures. This condition is satisﬁed in various models of international trade when
free trade is Pareto-eﬃcient and every country seeks to maximize its aggregate welfare. The
members of the initial group of liberalizing countries.
5Although the desirability of free trade can be questioned, for the purpose of this paper we assume that
free trade is desirable, and we seek to identify negotiation strategies that lead to global fee trade.
2concepts of externalities and superadditivity have been used by Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999),
Gomes (2003) and Maskin (2003) in various applications.
With these concepts in hand, we describe in Section 3 a benchmark result: if the payoﬀs
are grand-coalition superadditive and no coalition externalities exist, then the agenda-setter
is indiﬀerent between multilateral and sequential bargaining and the grand coalition forms
in equilibrium. Crucial for this result is the ability of countries to transfer utility within
coalitions by means of side payments. This ensures that the leader country is able to in-
ternalize the welfare gains from the grand coalition. In the absence of such transfers global
free trade may not be the equilibrium outcome, as Riezman (1985) showed in a cooperative
game-theoretic model.6 We believe, however, that it is realistic to model trade negotiations
as games with transferable utility, because the exchange of concessions on non-trade-related
issues often serves the role of transfers that redistribute the gains from trade liberalization.7
The benchmark result relies on the assumption that there are no coalition externalities.
As we show in Section 4, however, non-zero coalition externalities are the rule in the formation
of free trade areas. Intuitively, if the reduction in trade barriers associated with a free trade
area (FTA) aﬀects world prices, the welfare of outside countries or trading blocs will be
aﬀected by the FTA.8 Importantly, we show that externalities can be positive or negative,
depending on whether the FTA raises or lowers the world price of certain goods, and whether
outside countries are net importers or exporters of these goods.
The generic presence of coalition externalities motivates our analysis in Section 5, in
which we show that if the payoﬀs are grand-coalition superadditive and the coalition exter-
nalities are nonzero, then the leader is not indiﬀerent between multilateral and sequential
bargaining. In particular, the leader strictly prefers sequential bargaining when the coalition
externalities are negative in at least one country, and it strictly prefers multilateral bargain-
ing when the coalition externalities are positive in both follower countries. Furthermore, we
show that – regardless of the sign and size of coalition externalities – the grand coalition
forms in equilibrium, leading to global free trade. We label this result as our “Free Trade
Proposition”.9
6Burbridge et al. (1997) develop an alternative coalition-formation game in which the grand coalition fails
to form even with transfers within customs unions. Their result is, however, driven by the static nature of the
game and special features of the coalition-formation process.
7Non-trade-related concessions include agreements on product and labor standards, and political reforms,
such as the reforms that Mexico was expected to pursue in order to participate in NAFTA. Bagwell and Staiger
(2004a) justify the modelling of lump-sum transfers in a similar manner. Their analysis is focused, however,
on diﬀerent issues of trade negotiations.
8Bagwell and Staiger (2002) argue that the WTO’s principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination have
been designed to neutralize such externalities. But preferential trade agreements rely on GATT’s Article XXIV,
which speciﬁes exceptions to the principle of nondiscrimination, and these exceptions create discriminatory
rates of protection. See Bagwell and Staiger (2004b) for further details about this point. Chang and Winters
(2002) provide evidence of externalities caused by MERCOSUR, and Winters (1997) reviews the evidence of
such externalities in the process of European integration.
9Our eﬃciency result is distinct from the Kemp and Wan (1976) result about customs unions. In our
3In Section 6 we use two examples to illustrate these results. In the ﬁrst example sequential
bargaining is the equilibrium outcome, and it leads to global free trade. In the second example
multilateral bargaining is the equilibrium outcome, and it also leads to global free trade. We
show how these equilibria depend on trade structure and the structure of protection.
A corollary of the results from Sections 5 and 6 is that, when grand-coalition superadditiv-
ity holds, preferential trade agreements are neither building blocs nor stumbling blocs on the
way to worldwide free trade. Although, as in Levy (1997) and Krishna (1998), a preferential
trade agreement may raise the reservation payoﬀ of member countries in subsequent negotia-
tions, grand-coalition superadditivity ensures that the leader has an incentive to strike deals
that bring about global free trade. Similarly, although a preferential trade agreement may
exert a negative externality on outside countries, as in Baldwin (1996), and make sequential
negotiations more attractive for the agenda-setter, grand-coalition superadditivity ensures
that multilateral negotiations also lead to global free trade. As a result, preferential trade
agreements aﬀect the distribution of payoﬀs but not the attainment of global free trade.
In Section 7 we explore implications of the failure of grand-coalition superadditivity.
In particular, we derive conditions for the emergence of stumbling bloc and building bloc
equilibria. A stumbling bloc equilibrium is one in which the agenda setter prefers sequential
bargaining that does not lead to global free trade rather than multilateral bargaining that
leads to global free trade. And a building bloc equilibrium is one in which the agenda
setter prefers sequential bargaining that leads to global free trade rather than multilateral
bargaining that preserves the status quo. We illustrate such equilibria with two examples in
which negotiators maximize a function that describes a political objective, using an extreme
version of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of politics with special interest groups
in which this political-objective function coincides with aggregate proﬁts.
In the ﬁrst example, political pressure from special interests does not prevent multilateral
bargaining from leading to free trade. Nevertheless, world proﬁts are highest when the leader
forms a free trade area with one country only, and the leader prefers this limited FTA to
every other feasible outcome. Therefore the leader chooses sequential bargaining that does
not lead to global free trade. In this case preferential trade agreements are stumbling blocs
to worldwide free trade. If the WTO rules limited negotiations to multilateral bargaining,
general model, global free trade is attained for coalitions that can be customs unions, free trade areas, or
economic unions. In particular, in the analysis of free trade areas that we use to illustrate the broader logic of
these results the external tariﬀs of countries in a coalition do not change as a result of the formation of an FTA.
Moreover, the impact of the coalition on outside countri e si sp r e c i s e l yw h a td e t e r m i n e st h ec h o i c eb e t w e e n
sequential and multilateral bargaining. Unlike Kemp and Wan’s result, our eﬃciency result is driven by the
transferability of utility, which ensures that one country fully internalizes the gains from trade liberalization.
Our result is also distinct from the main result in Furusawa and Konishi (2004), who consider a network
of bilateral FTAs. Using network formation games, they show that in the presence of transferable utility the
global free trade network is pairwise stable.
4these constraints would ensure a free trade outcome in economies of this sort.10
In the second example multilateral bargaining does not lead to global free trade, because
the leader’s status-quo proﬁts are higher than the residual proﬁts it can get from an all-
encompassing FTA that the follower countries are willing to join. Moreover, the leader prefers
sequential bargaining, in which it gradually builds the grand coalition. In this case WTO
rules that restrict trade negotiations to multilateral bargaining would harm the prospects of
global free trade, whereas preferential trade agreements would encourage it.
In Section 8, we restore our assumption of GC superadditivity and explore alternative
mechanisms that generate deviations from our global free trade result.11 In particular, we
show that an agenda setter who makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to follower countries may
not be suﬃcient for global free trade when (i) following a rejection of its oﬀer by a follower
country in the ﬁrst stage of the sequential subgame, the leader is allowed to make an oﬀer to
the second follower country in stage two; or (ii) the leader cannot commit to a payoﬀ to the
follower country in the ﬁrst stage of the sequential bargaining subgame. These modiﬁcations
in the bargaining protocols can enhance the bargaining power of the follower countries to a
level at which the agenda-setter ﬁnds it too costly to attract both follower countries into a
FTA. We also show in Section 8 that under these circumstances sequential bargaining can be
a stumbling bloc for free trade but never a building bloc. Finally, we show that the structure
of coalition externalities shapes the choice between multilateral and sequential bargaining in
a way that is similar to the original model, as analyzed in Section 5. We oﬀer a summary of
the main results and suggestions for further research in Section 9.
2 The Bargaining Game
We consider a transferable-utility game between three countries: a, b,a n dc. We describe the
game in partition form. We deﬁne a coalition structure as a partition Γ of {a,b,c}.T h a ti s ,
every country belongs to exactly one coalition. We interpret a coalition as a free trade area
(FTA) in which member countries trade at zero tariﬀs.
10In Krishna (1998) the stumbling bloc eﬀect is derived in a model in which (i) markets are imperfectly
competitive and internationally segmented; (ii) governments maximize domestic proﬁts; and (iii) side payments
between coalition members are not available. Our analysis suggests that the second of these features can
produce a stumbling bloc eﬀect. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that this feature can also produce a
building bloc eﬀect, which Krishna (1998) derives in footnote 20, but chooses to de-emphasize. Saggi and
Yildiz (2006) also study the choice between bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations in an economic
environment similar to Krishna (1998). We will discuss their contribution in Section 8.
11At the end of Section 5, we show that our global free trade result holds in a variety of bargaining games:
games with many countries in which a rejection of the leader’s oﬀer ends the process of coalition formation,
games with many countries in which a rejection of the leader’s oﬀer transfers the agenda-setting power to a
diﬀerent country in a predetermined order, and games with many countries in which a rejection of the leader’s
oﬀer transfers stochastically the agenda-setting power to another country. We also show that it holds when
the leading country is allowed to oﬀer two subsequent FTAs to each of the two follower countries. Section 8
considers alternative bargaining protocols where our global free trade result may not hold.
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Figure 1: Game tree
For every partition Γ and every coalition C ∈ Γ the value function v(C;Γ) assigns a
payoﬀ to C given the coalition structure Γ.T h i s p a y o ﬀ is gross of lump-sum transfers. In
this and the next section we treat these value functions as given, but later we will show how
to construct them in speciﬁc models of international trade. The payoﬀ functions have to be
constructed from the objective functions that countries use to evaluate trade agreements.
The game is played as follows: One country is the leader, which means that it is the
agenda-setter. Without loss of generality we assign this role to country c.I nt h eﬁrst stage of
the game the leader decides whether to enter multilateral or sequential bargaining, as shown
in Figure 1.
If c chooses multilateral bargaining, it makes a simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
the follower countries a and b.T h eo ﬀer consists of an FTA that includes all countries and
a system of lump-sum transfers. The transfers determine the payoﬀs P (a) and P (b) to
countries a and b, respectively. If the oﬀer is accepted by both countries, Γ = h{abc}i is the
resulting coalition structure and the game ends. In this case Γ has a single element, consisting
of the grand coalition, and the FTA leads to worldwide free trade. This sequence of events
is described in the lower part of the game tree in Figure 1.
If one of the follower countries rejects c’s oﬀer, then the coalition {abc} does not form and
6the game ends with no agreement. In this event the coalition structure is Γ = h{a},{b},{c}i.12
This too is depicted in the lower part of the game tree in Figure 1.
Next consider the subgame in which c chooses sequential bargaining. In this event c has
to decide whether to make the ﬁrst take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to a or to b. If it makes the ﬁrst
oﬀer to a,t h eo ﬀer consists of an FTA between a and c and lump-sum transfers between them
that provide a with a payoﬀ P (a).I fa accepts the oﬀer, P (a) is a’s payoﬀ independently
of whether the FTA is expanded to include country b.13 If a rejects the oﬀer the game ends
and the coalition structure is Γ = h{a},{b},{c}i.14
Whenever a accepts c’s oﬀer, country c proceeds to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
b, which consists of an expansion of the FTA to include all three countries and lump-sum
transfers that provide b with a payoﬀ P (b).I f b accepts the oﬀer the coalition structure
is Γ = h{abc}i, and there is free trade. If b rejects the oﬀer the coalition structure is Γ =
h{ac},{b}i, i.e., a and c form a free trade area in which b is not included.
The subgame in which country c makes its ﬁrst oﬀer to b is symmetric and we omit its
discussion. The upper part of Figure 1 describes the branches of the sequential bargaining
subgame.
Note that in this game global free trade can emerge when the leader chooses either multi-
lateral or sequential bargaining, and lack of free trade can also occur under both bargaining
procedures. We seek a subgame perfect equilibrium. Country c chooses the bargaining
12We believe that this is a reasonable speciﬁcation for multilateral trade negotiations because the rules
of the WTO (in particular, Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement) state that the WTO should continue
the GATT practice of decision-making by “consensus,” where “the body concerned shall be deemed to have
decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting
when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.” It is important to emphasize, however,
that our assumption does not make full justice to the subtleties and nuances involved in the decision-making
process within the WTO. First, the same Article IX mentioned above states that “when a decision cannot be
arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting.” Hence, it is not strictly true that a
stubborn-enough country could single-handedly block a multilateral agreement. Second, even when decisions
are reached by consensus, in reaching that consensus it is usually the case that a larger weight is given to views
of particularly powerful countries in the trading system (see Jackson, 1997). Third, in the particular case of
market access negotiations, the WTO allows countries to negotiate bilateral or small-numbers agreements,
provided that that the provisions of these agreements are extended to the remaining members of the WTO on
an MFN basis (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2004a, for a theoretical treatment). Because the focus of our paper
is on a broad comparison of sequential trade liberalization versus multilateral trade liberalization, we have
decided to abstract from these important details and assume the bargaining protocol in Figure 1.
13I nt h es e q u e n t i a lb a r g a i n i n gs u b g a m ew ea s s u m et h a tw h e nc approaches country a ﬁrst, it oﬀers a a
non-contingent payoﬀ P (a) for joining the FTA. See Section 8.2 for a discussion of contingent payoﬀsa n dt h e
role of commitment in the leading country’s oﬀers.
14This assumption is relaxed in Sections 5 and 8.
7method that maximizes its payoﬀ.15,16
In order to simplify the notation, we deﬁne the following functions, which describe gross
payoﬀs (i.e., exclusive of lump-sum transfers):
W (j) ≡ v(j;{a},{b},{c}) for all j = a,b,c,
WF (j) ≡ v(j;{j},{k }) for all j,k,  = a,b,c and j 6= k, j 6=  , k 6=  ,
W (k ) ≡ v(k ;{j},{k }) for all j,k,  = a,b,c and k 6=  , k 6= j,   6= j,
W (abc) ≡ v(abc;{a,b,c}).
In this notation W (j) is country j’s payoﬀ when there are no free trade agreements; WF (j)
is country j’s payoﬀ when the other two countries form an FTA in which j is not included;
W (k ) is the joint payoﬀ of countries k and   when they form an FTA in which the third
country is not included; and W (abc) is the joint payoﬀ of all three countries when they form
an all-inclusive free trade agreement.17
A coalition C is not subject to coalition externalities when its payoﬀ is independent of
what other coalitions form. In our three-player game this suggests a simple deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition: Coalition Externalities There are positive coalition externalities in country
j when WF (j) >W(j), negative coalition externalities when WF (j) <W(j), and no
coalition externalities when WF (j)=W (j).
We also need a concept of superadditivity, which we deﬁne as follows:
15This formulation of the game shows clearly that if utility were nontransferable, the agenda setter would
strictly prefer sequential bargaining only if it expected to form an agreement with only one follower country,
excluding the other from the FTA. The reason is that when utility is not transferable, the agenda setter’s
payoﬀ from a coalition structure is independent of the path through which this coalition structure is attained
(and this is true for all coalition externalities). Thus, for example, the agenda setter obtains the same payoﬀ
from the grand coalition independently of whether it has been formed via multilateral or sequential bargaining.
Under these circumstances preferential trade agreements cannot be building blocs of global free trade when
global free trade is not the equilibrium outcome in the multilateral bargaining subgame.
16Our game is also relevant for European integration. See CEPR (1995), and especially Section 3.3 on
principles of ﬂexible integration strategies.
17The gross payoﬀs W (·) and WF (·) will typically depend on the lump-sum transfers across countries, as
is well known from the early work of Samuelson (1952, 1954), and the subsequent work of Jones (1970) and
Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983), among others. This dependence stems from the fact that a transfer
aﬀects the terms of trade of the giving and receiving countries, as well as the terms of trade of other trading
countries. Yet there are special cases, such as the economic model we develop in Section 6, in which transfers
do not change international prices, and they therefore have no impact on the gross payoﬀ functions. It is
easiest to think about these special cases when interpreting our bargaining model, but we shall argue below
that it is possible to reinterpret the payoﬀ functions W (·) and WF (·) i naw a yt h a tm a k e st h et h e o r ym o r e
generally applicable.
8Deﬁnition: Grand-Coalition (GC) Superadditivity There is GC superadditivity if
W (abc) >W(a)+W (b)+W (c), and
W (abc) >W F (j)+W (k ) for all j 6= k, j 6=  .
In other words, grand-coalition superadditivity requires the joint payoﬀs of the three countries
to be larger under global free trade than under no free trade agreements whatsoever or a free
trade agreement between any two countries k and  .
3B e n c h m a r k
In this section we characterize equilibria for games with GC superadditivity and no coalition
externalities in the follower countries. This helps in developing the intuition and provides a
benchmark for more general games.
First consider the subgame with multilateral bargaining. Let c oﬀer a free trade agreement
between all countries, with payoﬀs P (a) and P (b).I f W (a) >P(a) country a rejects the
oﬀer, because a gets a higher payoﬀ in the coalition structure Γ = h{a},{b},{c}i.A n d i f
W (b) >P(b) country b rejects the oﬀer. When the oﬀer is rejected by either a or b,t h e
leader’s payoﬀ is
P (c)=W (c).
It is evident that under these circumstances c has to oﬀer a at least W (a) and it has to
oﬀer b at least W (b) for the FTA to be accepted by both countries. Therefore c’s highest
payoﬀ from oﬀers that are accepted by a and b is
P (c)=W (abc) − W (a) − W (b), (1)
where P (a)=W (a) and P (b)=W (b) are c’s oﬀers. GC superadditivity implies, however,
that
W (abc) − W (a) − W (b) >W(c).
Therefore in the subgame of multilateral bargaining c prefers to make an oﬀer that the follower
countries accept, which leads to the formation of the grand coalition and to worldwide free
trade.18
18Suppose that the payoﬀ of the grand coalition depends on transfers, and let ˆ W [abc;P (a),P(b)] be this
payoﬀ as a function of the payoﬀso fc o u n t r i e sa and b. But assume that ˆ W [abc;P (a),P(b)]−P (a)−P (b) is
declining in P (a) and in P (b). This is the case if a transfer of income from country c to a or from c to b leads
to a loss of welfare in c, after accounting for changes in the terms of trade. That is, this assumption excludes
the possibility that, say, a transfer of income from c to a will improve c’s terms of trade to such an extent that
it will gain on net from the transfer. Under this assumption the argument in the text applies when W (abc)
9Next consider the subgame with sequential bargaining, and examine the case in which c
approaches a ﬁrst and oﬀers it an FTA with a payoﬀ P (a).I f W (a) >P(a) the oﬀer is
rejected and c’s payoﬀ is P (c)=W (c). Therefore c has to oﬀer a at least W (a) for a to
accept the oﬀer, and it is in c’s interest to oﬀer just W (a).I fc then proceeds to make b an
oﬀer that b rejects, the leader’s payoﬀ is
P (c)=W (ac) − W (a).
If, instead, c wants to make b an acceptable oﬀer, c has to oﬀer b ap a y o ﬀ of at least W (b),
and c has no interest in making a higher oﬀer.19 Therefore (1) also describes c’s payoﬀ from
an oﬀer that b accepts. But GC superadditivity implies that
W (abc) − W (a) − W (b) >W(ac) − W (a).
Therefore c prefers to make acceptable oﬀers to both follower countries rather than only to
a. Note also that under GC superadditivity
W (abc) − W (a) − W (b) >W(c),
which implies that country c prefers to make acceptable oﬀers to the follower countries rather
than an oﬀer that a rejects.
Similar results obtain when country c makes its ﬁrst oﬀer to b. In fact, in the subgame with
sequential bargaining the leader’s payoﬀ is the same independently of whether it approaches
a or b ﬁrst. In both cases c prefers to make oﬀers that both follower countries accept, which
leads to the formation of the grand coalition and to worldwide free trade.
We note that in both the multilateral and sequential bargaining subgames, the grand
coalition forms, and (1) is country c’s payoﬀ.W eh a v et h e r e f o r ep r o v e dt h e
Benchmark Proposition If there are no coalition externalities in the follower countries
and there is GC superadditivity, then:
(i) the leader is indiﬀerent between multilateral and sequential bargaining; and
(ii) the grand coalition forms and there is global free trade.
This proposition establishes our benchmark. Deviations from this benchmark can result
from coalition externalities or from the failure of GC superadditivity. We ﬁrst show in the
is interpreted to be W (abc) ≡ ˆ W [abc;W (a),W(b)]. The gross payoﬀ functions can be redeﬁn e di ns i m i l a r
fashion for other arguments in the main text. For ease of exposition, however, we shall think about economic
models of the type developed in Section 6, in which transfers do not aﬀect the terms of trade.
19More accurately, c h a st oo ﬀer b at least WF (b),b u tWF (b)=W (b) because there are no coalition
externalities in b.
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Figure 2: Coalition externalities
next section that coalition externalities are generic features of free trade agreements, and
we characterize in the subsequent section equilibria with such externalities and GC superad-
ditivity. There we argue that GC superadditivity is satisﬁed in a competitive environment
in which the objective function of every country is to maximize the aggregate welfare of its
residents.
4 Coalition Externalities
We show in this section that free trade agreements lead naturally to coalition externalities.
We interpret an FTA as an agreement that removes tariﬀs on trade between members of
the FTA whereas every country in the FTA maintains its original rates of protection vis à
vis countries outside the FTA. This interpretation is consistent with GATT/WTO Article
XXIV.
Consider a particular industry whose goods are imported from b by countries a and c and
in which the rate of protection is higher in a than in c. Figure 2 depicts the import demand
function in country a, Ca −Xa,w h e r eCa represents demand and Xa represents supply in a,
as well as two possible supply functions in c, Xc [1] and Xc [2].20 The international price of
the product is p whereas τa and τc represent 1 plus the rate of protection in countries a and
c, respectively. By assumption, τa >τ c, and therefore the consumer and producer price in
a, τap, exceeds the consumer and producer price in c, τcp.W ea l s oa s s u m et h a tt h ee x p o r t
20This discussion borrows from Grossman and Helpman (1995). See also Richardson (1993).
11supply function of country b,n o td r a w ni nt h eﬁgure, is upward sloping.
First suppose that Xc [1] is the supply function in c and let us examine how the joint excess
demand of countries a and c changes as a result of an FTA between them. It is evident from
the ﬁgure that if the price in a were to decline to the price τcp in c,t h e nc o u n t r yc would
be able to supply the entire import demand of a at this lower price. For this reason the
price in a declines to τcp and a switches to import the product from c without violating
the rules of origin, which are standard provisions of such agreements.21 This is a case of
reduced protection, which leads to trade creation within the free trade area. Since prices do
not change in c, c’ sn e ti m p o r td e m a n dCc − Xc [1] does not change as well. It follows that,
at the original international price p,t h ej o i n ti m p o r td e m a n do fa and c rises. As a result,
the world’s excess demand for the product rises, leading to a higher international price p.
The increase in the international price aﬀects the payoﬀ of country b.I f , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e
objective function of country b is to maximize the aggregate welfare of its residents, then the
FTA between a and c imposes a positive coalition externality on b,b e c a u s ei ti m p r o v e sb’s
terms of trade. In this event WF (b) >W(b). Naturally, this discussion is conﬁned to one
industry only and a proper evaluation of coalition externalities requires an examination of
the aggregate eﬀects across all sectors. Yet the main message of this example is broad: we
should expect nonzero coalition externalities when free trade areas form.22
Coalition externalities can be positive or negative. We showed in the previous paragraph
that they can be positive. Now we show that they can be negative.
Suppose that the supply function in country c is Xc [2]. In this event, suppliers in c do
not oﬀer enough output at the price τap to satisfy country a’s import demand at this price,
so even if country a were to purchase all of c’s output it would still need to import from b.
As a result an FTA between a and c does not change the consumer and producer prices in
country a,w h i c hr e m a i nτap, and it does not change the consumer price in c,w h i c hr e m a i n s
τcp. However, it does change the producer price in c,w h i c hr i s e st oτap, the price in a.T h e
producer price in c rises because the FTA permits these producers to sell in a without the
tariﬀ impediments, and the price in a is higher than in c. As a consequence producers in c sell
their entire output in a and consumers in c import their entire consumption from b.T h i si sa
case of enhanced protection; the FTA leads to higher (producer) prices. Since the consumer
prices do not change while the producer price rises in c and does not change in a,t h ej o i n t
import demand of countries a and c declines. Therefore p declines, worsening b’s terms of
trade. This worsening of the terms of trade generates a negative coalition externality on b if
21Note that the FTA reshuﬄes trade ﬂows. Country a ceases to import from b despite a’s expansion of
imports. But country c increases its imports from b in order to allow a to purchase goods in c. Yet standard
rules of origin are not violated, because a can import from c only products that are produced in c.T h e r ei s
no need for products that c imports from b to be exported from c to a in order to meet a’s demand.
22This example delivers precise answers about coalition externalities when the economic structure is of the
type discussed in Section 6.
12b’s objective is to maximize the joint welfare of its residents, i.e., WF (b) <W(b).
It is now clear that there are very good reasons for nonzero coalition externalities in free
trade agreements.23 We therefore proceed to discuss solutions to the bargaining game in the
presence of such externalities.
5 Free Trade with Coalition Externalities
Consider payoﬀs v(C;Γ) that exhibit coalition externalities, but which are GC superadditive.
This speciﬁcation deviates from the benchmark in Section 3 by allowing coalition externalities.
Under these circumstances the payoﬀ of c from multilateral bargaining is the same as in the
benchmark case, i.e. (1), because the solution to the multilateral subgame depends only on
GC superadditivity and not on coalition externalities. It follows that multilateral bargaining
leads to the formation of the grand coalition and to free trade.
Next consider sequential bargaining. If c ﬁrst oﬀers a an FTA and a payoﬀ P (a)=W (a),
then a accepts the oﬀer.24 In this event c has to oﬀer b ap a y o ﬀ P (b)=WF (b) for b to join
the FTA. Since GC superadditivity implies that
W (abc) − W (a) − WF (b) >W(ac) − W (a),
country c gains from expanding the free trade area to include b once it has formed an FTA with
a, because the left-hand-side of this inequality represents c’s payoﬀ from an all-encompassing
free trade area while the right-hand-side represents c’s payoﬀ from a free trade area with
a only. It follows that c’s payoﬀ from making acceptable oﬀers in a sequential bargaining
subgame in which c approaches a ﬁrst is
Pa,b (c)=W (abc) − W (a) − WF (b).
By similar argument c’s payoﬀ from making acceptable oﬀers in a sequential bargaining
subgame in which c approaches b ﬁrst is
Pb,a (c)=W (abc) − W (b) − WF (a),
23The empirical evidence points in the same direction. Reviewing the literature on European economic
integration, Winters (1997) reports that most studies ﬁnd what amounts to negative coalition externalities.
Chang and Winters (2002) ﬁnd that MERCOSUR has worsened the terms of trade of a number of non-
member countries, including the U.S. and Japan. MERCOSUR is a customs union between Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay. Unlike a free trade area, a customs union imposes common external tariﬀso nn o n -
member countries. Chang and Winters ﬁnd that foreign prices charged to Brazil by non-MERCOSUR countries
declined as a result of Brazil’s lowering of tariﬀs on goods imported from Argentina.
24Note that a accepts every oﬀer that satisﬁes P (a) ≥ W (a), but it is in c’s interest to oﬀer W (a).I nw h a t
follows we restrict c’s oﬀers to the lowest payoﬀs P (j) that the other parties accept, which is a condition for
subgame perfection.
13as long as there is GC superadditivity. Comparing Pa,b (c) with Pb,a (c) we see that c is
indiﬀerent between which country it approaches ﬁrst if and only if WF (a)−W (a)=WF (b)−
W (b), i.e., the coalition externalities are the same in the two follower countries. This holds in
the benchmark case, in which the coalition externalities are zero. Moreover, a comparison of
these payoﬀss h o w st h a tc strictly prefers to approach the country with the higher coalition
externalities ﬁrst, i.e., it prefers to approach a ﬁrst if WF (a) − W (a) >W F (b) − W (b)
and it prefers to approach b ﬁrst if WF (a) − W (a) <W F (b) − W (b). The reason is that
by approaching the country with the higher coalition externalities ﬁrst the leader reduces
the joint outside options of the follower countries. We conclude that c’s highest payoﬀ from
sequential bargaining with acceptable oﬀers is
Paccept (c)=W (abc) − W (a) − W (b) − min{WF (a) − W (a),W F (b) − W (b)}. (2)
Now note that c has the option of making oﬀers that are rejected by the ﬁrst country. A
rejection gives c the payoﬀ W (c). For this reason c does not proceed with acceptable oﬀers
unless W (c) ≤ Paccept (c).
It remains to compare the leader’s payoﬀs from multilateral and sequential bargaining.
Comparing (1) with (2) implies
Paccept (c)=Pmulti (c) − min{WF (a) − W (a),W F (b) − W (b)},
where Pmulti (c)=W (abc) − W (a) − W (b) is c’s payoﬀ in the multilateral subgame. It
follows immediately that c prefers sequential bargaining when
min{WF (a) − W (a),W F (b) − W (b)} < 0
and multilateral bargaining when25
min{WF (a) − W (a),W F (b) − W (b)} > 0.
Moreover, whichever subgame c prefers leads to the formation of the grand coalition and to
global free trade. We have thereby proved
Free Trade Proposition If there is GC superadditivity, then:
(i) the leader is indiﬀerent between multilateral and sequential bargaining if and only if there
25Note that min{WF (a) − W (a),W F (b) − W (b)} < 0 implies Paccept (c) >P multi (a) >W(c),w h e r et h e
last inequality results from GC superadditivity. Therefore in this case c prefers sequential bargaining with
acceptable oﬀers to sequential bargaining in which the ﬁrst oﬀer is rejected. The only case in which c prefers
sequential bargaining in which the ﬁrst oﬀer is rejected rather than accepted is when c also prefers multilateral
to sequential bargaining.
14are no coalition externalities in the follower countries;
(ii) the leader strictly prefers sequential bargaining when there are negative coalition exter-
nalities in at least one of the follower countries;
(iii) the leader strictly prefers multilateral bargaining when there are positive coalition ex-
ternalities in both follower countries; and
(iv) the grand coalition forms and there is worldwide free trade.
This proposition states that global free trade is the unique equilibrium outcome when payoﬀs
are GC superadditive. It also identiﬁes conditions under which sequential or multilateral
bargaining is the equilibrium outcome. Sequential bargaining is the equilibrium outcome
when negative coalition externalities exist in at least one follower country, while multilateral
bargaining is the equilibrium outcome when positive coalition externalities exist in both
follower countries.26
Our Free Trade proposition has important implications.27 Consider a neoclassical world
in which production sets are convex, tariﬀs are the only distortions, and all markets are com-
petitive. Also suppose that the payoﬀ of every country is represented by the aggregate welfare
of its residents and that the marginal utility of income is constant. Then GC superadditivity
holds, because global free trade is Pareto-eﬃcient. That is, in this sort of world, lump-sum
transfers ensure that the joint welfare of all three countries combined is higher under free
trade than under limited free trade agreements or no free trade agreement at all. Under these
circumstances our free trade proposition applies, and trade negotiations lead to global free
trade.
It follows from this proposition that in the presence of GC superadditivity countries need
not be restricted to multilateral bargaining – as favored by Bhagwati (1991) – in order to
safeguard free trade, because it is not in the interest of the leading country to choose sequential
bargaining unless it leads to free trade. True, an institutional prohibition on sequential
bargaining secures free trade. But, as we will show in Section 7, the potential advantage
of multilateral bargaining disappears when payoﬀs are not GC superadditive. Finally, note
that even with GC superadditivity, restrictions on bargaining have distributional implications.
The leading country’s payoﬀ is higher when it is free to choose whether to bargain sequentially
or multilaterally than when it is restricted to bargaining multilaterally, unless it prefers
26Note that country c has an incentive to pursue policies that hurt the outside option WF (j) of country j
when c s e e k st ob r i n gj into the FTA in the last stage of the sequential bargaining subgame. If this option is
feasible, then such policies can be built into the payoﬀ f u n c t i o n ss ot h a tt h ep a y o ﬀsr e ﬂect the implementation
of these policies.
27Although our focus is on free trade agreements, this type of analysis can be applied to other international
agreements. In environmental agreements, for example, the coalition externalities are positive; see Carraro
and Siniscalco (1993).
15multilateral bargaining. Recall, however, that the leader prefers sequential bargaining if and
only if at least one follower country has negative coalition externalities. In this case a switch
from unrestricted bargaining to mandatory multilateral bargaining redistributes payoﬀsf r o m
the leading country to the follower country with the largest negative coalition externalities.28
5.1 Generalizations
Our Free Trade Proposition can be generalized, and we oﬀer four such generalizations.
First, consider the case in which the leader country is allowed to sign two subsequent
b i l a t e r a lF T A sw i t he a c ho n eo ft h et w of o l l o w er countries. For this purpose we expand the
deﬁnition of GC superadditivity to also cover the coalition structure Γ = h{ac},{bc}i,w h i c h
consists of two FTAs, one between a and c, the other between b and c. To the deﬁnition of
GC superadditivity we now add the requirement that W (abc) >W(ac,bc), i.e., aggregate
welfare is higher under the grand coalition than under Γ = h{ac},{bc}i.
To see that this modiﬁcation does not aﬀect our Free Trade Proposition, consider the
branch of the sequential subgame on which c approaches a ﬁrst and b second (the other case
is analogous). Suppose c makes a an oﬀer that a accepts and they form an FTA. Next c
approaches b, and now allow c to not only oﬀer global free trade to b, but also to oﬀer b
the possibility of a bilateral FTA. At this point a and c have formed a bilateral FTA, so
regardless of the nature of c’s second-stage oﬀer, country b’s reservation price is WF (b).
Now roll back and consider the negotiation between c and a in stage one. Since a rejection
of c’s oﬀer leaves a with the payoﬀ W (a), and this payoﬀ is independent of what c might
oﬀer b in the second stage should a accept the oﬀer, the agenda setter has to pay W (a)
in order to bring a into any coalition. It follows that c has to pay WF (b)+W (a) for the
formation of the grand coalition as well as for the formation of Γ = h{ac},{bc}i. In other
words, the two alternative coalition structures are equally costly to the agenda setter. But
GC superadditivity implies that W (abc) >W(ac,bc). Therefore c prefers to form the grand
coalition. In sum, a pair of subsequent FTAs is a dominated strategy in our sequential
subgame and therefore the Free Trade Proposition holds in this case too.
Three further generalizations and modiﬁcations, based on part (iv) of the proposition –
which states that the grand coalition forms, leading to global free trade – are oﬀered in
Appendix A. The ﬁrst generalization considers a world with many countries, but maintains
the assumption of the simple model that the game ends when the leader’s oﬀer is rejected
by one of the follower countries. As in the simple game, the leader can make a simultaneous
oﬀer to all follower countries, which we refer to as multilateral bargaining. Alternatively,
28To illustrate, suppose that WF (b) − W (b) <W F (a) − W (a) and WF (b) − W (b) < 0.T h e na’s payoﬀ is
W (a) under sequential and multilateral bargaining, but b’s payoﬀ is WF (b) under sequential bargaining and
W (b) under multilateral bargaining. Evidently, b prefers multilateral bargaining while c prefers sequential
bargaining.
16it can engage in sequential bargaining, in which case it makes an oﬀe rt oas u b s e to ft h e
follower countries. If this oﬀer is rejected the game ends and there are no FTAs. If the
oﬀer is accepted, the leader can make a second oﬀer to a subset of countries that are not
yet included in the FTA. If the oﬀer is rejected the game ends and the coalition structure
consists of the FTA formed in round one. If the oﬀer is accepted, the FTA is expanded and
the leader country can make a new oﬀer to a subset of countries that are still outside the
FTA. This process continues until either an oﬀer is rejected by one of the follower countries
or all the countries are included in the free trade area.
The second extension also considers a world with many countries, but this time a rejection
of the leader’s oﬀer does not end the game. Instead, the agenda-setting power is transferred
to another country in a predetermined order. That is, if the original leader’s oﬀer is rejected
by one of the follower countries, then the agenda-setting power is transferred to a follower
country. The country chosen is the ﬁrst in the queue for leadership among the countries that
are not members of the ﬁrst leader’s FTA. The new leader can form a new FTA by oﬀering
membership to countries that are not yet members of an FTA. In this way a new FTA forms.
When an oﬀer of the new leader is rejected, the agenda-setting power is again transferred to
a country that is not a member of an FTA, using the predetermined queue. And the process
continues in the same way with additional leaders. The game ends when all countries are
members of FTAs, some of which may consist of one country only, and there are no more
leaders to whom the agenda-setting power can be transferred. Unlike the original game, this
one allows for multiple FTAs.
In our ﬁnal extension a rejection of the leader’s oﬀer again leads to the transfer of agenda-
setting power to a follower country that is not a member of an FTA. This time, however, the
next leader is chosen randomly from the eligible set of countries, deﬁned as countries that are
not members of an FTA and were not leaders in earlier rounds of negotiations. This setup is
similar to Gomes (2003).29
We conclude from these extensions and modiﬁcations that GC superadditivity is a power-
ful feature; it ensures the formation of the grand coalition and global free trade for a variety of
bargaining protocols, independently of the structure of coalition externalities.30 The coalition
externalities aﬀect the sequence in which the FTA expands, but not the equilibrium coalition
structure. They also aﬀect the equilibrium payoﬀs, i.e., the distribution of the gains from
trade negotiations. Moreover, although multilateral negotiations ensure the formation of the
grand coalition in all the above cases, the equilibrium bargaining process need not consist of
an oﬀer to all follower countries combined; the leader may gain more from sequential oﬀers.
Finally, note that our results also apply to situations in which countries organize them-
selves into free trade areas prior to the beginning of the game. In this event a country
29We are grateful to Eddie Dekel and Attila Ambrus for referring us to this paper.
30See, however, our discussion in Section 8 for diﬀerent alternatives.
17can be interpreted as a bloc of countries that have formed an FTA, and all the arguments
made above remain valid. This means that if there are regional trade agreements or other
preferential trade agreements prior to the beginning of our negotiation process, then these
limited agreements do not prevent the attainment of global free trade when payoﬀsa r eG C
superadditive.31
6 Illustrations of the Free Trade Proposition
In this section we construct an economic model that gives precise meaning to the payoﬀ
functions W (·) and WF (·), and we use the model to illustrate the free trade proposition. In
this model importing countries impose tariﬀs and a coalition consistso faf r e et r a d ea r e a .
Standard rules of origin apply in the FTA and they prohibit a member country from importing
goods from outside the FTA via another member country that has lower tariﬀs.
We assume that the utility function of the residents of country j is quasi-linear, given by
Uj = yj + uj (xj), (3)
where yj is their consumption of good y and xj is their consumption of good x. The function
uj (·) is increasing and concave. Good y is the numeraire; its price is one and it is not
protected by tariﬀs. As is well known, if such consumers have enough income to consume
both goods, which we assume to be the case, the demand for x depends only on its price,
xj = Cj (qj), and this demand function is downward sloping. Then country j’s indirect utility
function is
Vj = Ij + Sj (qj),
where Ij is its income and Sj (qj) ≡ uj [Cj (qj)] − qjCj (qj) is the consumer surplus function.
By standard arguments S0
j (qj)=−Cj (qj).
Assume that good y is produced with 1 unit of labor per unit output, whereas x is
produced with labor and a sector-speciﬁc input under constant returns to scale. Then the
wage rate equals 1 as long as the country produces y, which we assume to be the case, and
the income of the sector-speciﬁc input, which we shall identify with proﬁts, is an increasing
31Although, as we have shown, the bargaining protocol need not be restricted to sequential or multilateral
bargaining in order to achieve global free trade when payoﬀs are GC superadditive, restrictions on bargaining
may be desirable for other reasons. Imagine, for example, a world of three countries in which payoﬀsa r eG C
superadditive and countries are symmetric in the sense that (i) W (j)=w for j = a,b,c and WF (j)=wF
for j = a,b,c; and (ii) every country has an equal chance of becoming the agenda setter. Moreover, coalition
externalities are negative, i.e., w>w F. Under these circumstances the country that becomes the agenda setter
chooses sequential bargaining, which gives it the payoﬀ W (abc)−w−wF, one of the follower countries gets the
payoﬀ w and the other follower country gets the payoﬀ wF. Then, behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance these
c o u n t r i e sp r e f e rt or e s t r i c tt h eb a r gaining protocol to multilateral bargaining only, which gives the agenda
setter the payoﬀ W (abc) − 2w and each one of the follower countries the payoﬀ w. This restriction raises the
payoﬀ of the least fortunate country, meeting the Rawlsian criterion of seeking to minimize the downside risk.
18convex function Πj (qj). By standard arguments Π0
j (qj)=Xj (qj),w h e r eXj (qj) is an
upward sloping supply function of x.
Let τj be 1 plus the MFN tariﬀ rate on imports of x.32 If x is exported by country j we
set τj =1 . That is, we assume that there are no export taxes or subsidies. Then qj = τjp
is the consumer and producer price in the absence of free trade agreements, where p is the
international price of good x.T a r i ﬀ revenue is distributed to country j’s residents, who
also own the country’s labor and sector-speciﬁc input. Under these circumstances income Ij
consists of labor income, proﬁts and tariﬀ revenue. Therefore in the absence of free trade
agreements the indirect utility function is33
Vj = Lj + Πj (τjp)+( τj − 1)p[Cj (τjp) − Xj (τjp)] + Sj (τjp), (4)
where Lj is labor supply. In the absence of free trade agreements the international price p is
determined by the market clearing condition
X
j=a,b,c
[Cj (τjp) − Xj (τjp)] = 0.
Evidently, the international price depends on the rates of protection.
In the following examples we assume that W (j) equals the indirect utility Vj that country
j attains in the absence of free trade agreements; W (jk) equals the sum of the indirect utilities
Vj +Vk that countries j and k attain when they form an FTA that does not include the third
country; WF (j) equals the indirect utility Vj that j a t t a i n sw h e ni ti sn o ti n c l u d e di naf r e e
trade area formed by the other two countries; and W (abc) equals the sum of the indirect
utilities Va+Vb+Vc that the three countries attain under free trade. As is well known, under
these circumstances free trade yields the highest sum of utilities and therefore the payoﬀsa r e
GC superadditive. These payoﬀs are generated by governments that maximize the aggregate
welfare of their residents.
Example 1: Equilibrium Sequential Bargaining
Suppose that in the equilibrium with no trade agreements country c exports x while
countries a and b import x.M o r e o v e r , a and b impose tariﬀs τa > 1 and τb > 1.A l s o
suppose that if c forms a free trade area with one of the follower countries the FTA leads to
reduced protection (recall the discussion of reduced and enhanced protection in Section 4).
32An MFN tariﬀ is one in which the same tariﬀ rate applies to imports from all sources, according to the
most favored nation (MFN) clause. We use this speciﬁcation in the examples, but our free trade proposition
a p p l i e sa l s ow h e nt h et a r i ﬀsd on o ts a t i s f yt h i sr e q u i r e m e n t .
33As we have seen in Section 4, free trade agreements can produce a deviation of the consumer price from
the producer price. The formulation of the indirect utility function has to be modiﬁed in an obvious way when
this happens.
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Figure 3: FTA raises b’s import price
Then the free trade area with one of the follower countries raises the international price of x.
This is illustrated in Figure 3 for an FTA between c and a. The supply of exports
by c is represented by Xc (p) − Cc (p) while the aggregate import demand function of the
follower countries is
P
j=a,b [Cj (τjp) − Xj (τjp)]. In the absence of free trade agreements the
international price is determined by the intersection of these two curves, identifying pn as the
equilibrium price.
An FTA between c and a shifts rightward the aggregate import demand curve of countries
a and b to the broken-line curve, because the import demand function of country a shifts from
Ca (τap)−Xa (τap) to Ca (p)−Xa (p).34 The international price rises, worsening b’s terms of
trade. As a result Vb declines. In this event there are negative coalition externalities in b.35
Therefore our proposition implies that in this example the equilibrium consists of sequential
bargaining in which c makes an oﬀer to the country with the larger coalition externalities
ﬁr s t ,a n da no ﬀer to the country with the smaller coalition externalities second, which in this
case is negative.36
34Reduced protection requires Ca (pn) − Xa (pn) <X c (pn).
35Note that (4) implies
∂Vj
∂p
= −(Cj − Xj)τj +( τj − 1)p

C
0
j − X
0
j

τj .
This is negative if j imports x, and it is positive if j exports x and τj =1 .
36This example also illustrates the dangers of inferring the sign and size of coalition externalities from the
available studies of regional trade agreements (see footnote 23 for references). Our model calls attention to
the existence of an important selection bias, since we predict that these partial agreements will be signed only
when they create a negative externality for the country that is temporarily left out. This suggests that positive
externalities might well exist in the data, but we might never observe them in studies of partial agreements.
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Figure 4: FTA raises b’s export price
Example 2: Equilibrium Multilateral Bargaining
Suppose that in the equilibrium with no trade agreements country c imports x from each
of the follower countries and c’s MFN tariﬀ is τc > 1. Figure 4 depicts c’s import demand
function Cc (τcp) − Xc (τcp) and the joint export supply function
P
j=a,b [Xj (p) − Cj (p)] of
the follower countries. With no free trade agreements the equilibrium international price is
pn.
Now suppose that c forms an FTA with a, and assume that the FTA leads to reduced
protection.37 Then the price in c declines to the price in a, which equals the international
price. As a result the import demand function Cc (τcp)−Xc (τcp) changes to Cc (p)−Xc (p),
which is depicted in the ﬁgure by a rightward shift of the Cc − Xc curve to the broken-line
curve, and the international price rises. Unlike the previous example, however, this time the
price hike concerns b’s exports. Therefore b’s terms of trade improve and Vb rises. Evidently,
b has positive coalition externalities.
We can establish in similar fashion positive coalition externalities in a. Under these
circumstances our proposition implies that multilateral bargaining takes place in equilibrium.
These two examples together with the examples discussed in Section 4 suggest that the
equilibrium bargaining method depends not only on the pattern of trade, but also on ﬁner
details of the supply and demand functions. To see why, reconsider Example 2. We assumed
37Namely, Cc (pn) − Xc (pn) <X a (pn).
21in the example that the formation of an FTA between c and either one of the follower
countries leads to reduced protection. This resulted in positive coalition externalities in the
follower countries. Now suppose instead that the formation of an FTA between c and a
leads to enhanced protection. Namely, Cc (τcpn) − Xc (τcpn) >X a (τcpn). In this event b
is subject to negative coalition externalities, because – by raising the supply price in a to
the supply price in c – the FTA raises the export supply of country a, thereby reducing the
international price. The lower international price of x is detrimental to b,w h i c he x p o r t sx.
In this event our proposition implies sequential bargaining in equilibrium, because negative
coalition externalities exist in one of the follower countries. Evidently, the same pattern of
trade can lead to diﬀerent equilibrium bargaining protocols.
7 No GC Superadditivity
GC superadditivity is central to our benchmark and free trade propositions. In particular,
when GC superadditivity fails, free trade is not necessarily the unique equilibrium outcome.
We argued in the previous section that GC superadditivity holds when the aggregate welfare
o fac o u n t r y ’ sr e s i d e n t si su s e da si t sp a y o ﬀ, no distortions exist other than tariﬀs, production
sets are convex, and all markets are competitive. A modiﬁcation of any one of these features
can destroy GC superadditivity. If, for example, markets are not competitive, then free trade
is not Pareto-eﬃcient, and GC superadditivity may not hold.38
Of particular interest is lack of GC superadditivity that stems from political economy con-
siderations. Suppose that the payoﬀ from a free trade agreement is not represented by the
aggregate welfare of a country’s residents, but rather by a political-objective function. Fol-
lowing Grossman and Helpman (1994), think about countries whose political activities lead
to policies that maximize a function of aggregate welfare and political contributions. Then
the interaction of the government with special interest groups leads to the maximization
of a weighted average of aggregate welfare and the welfare of the special interests.39 Un-
der these circumstances GC superadditivity may fail, and equilibria without free trade can
emerge.40 When this happens, it is possible to evaluate in a meaningful way the desirability
of restrictions on the bargaining protocol.
Our approach follows the logic of constitutional design, where one seeks restrictions on the
executive that yield desirable outcomes. The desirable outcomes do not necessarily include
38GC superadditivity may also fail when some sectors are excluded from the preferential trade agreements,
or when tariﬀs are reduced, but not to zero, among the parties to an agreement. Exclusion of some sectors,
and slow phasing in of other sectors, are common features of preferential trade agreements.
39See Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a systematic discussion of such political objective functions and
the ways in which they can arise in various polities.
40Note that GC superadditivity holds when the weight on aggregate welfare is suﬃciently higher than the
weight on contributions. This follows from continuity and the fact that when this relative weight goes to
inﬁnity GC superadditivity holds.
22objectives of the political players, but they do include objectives of the polity at large. Under
these circumstances constitutional features seek to achieve the desirable outcomes despite the
fact that the political players may have diﬀerent objectives from the polity. In our context
this means that we are interested in identifying situations in which free trade is attained even
when policy makers do not seek to maximize aggregate welfare. Despite a possible lack of
congruence between the objectives of policy makers and the polity at large, our Free Trade
Proposition shows that with GC superadditivity in the policy makers’ objective functions,
free trade — which maximizes aggregate welfare under neoclassical conditions — is the unique
equilibrium outcome.
As discussed in the introduction, economists disagree about the merits of restricting trade
negotiations to multilateral bargaining. Some prominent economists, Bhagwati (1991) among
them, hold the view that preferential trade agreements that do not include all countries are
detrimental to the achievement of worldwide free trade. We interpret this position as an
objection to sequential bargaining in the formation of trade agreements. Using Bhagwati’s
terminology, preferential trade agreements are “stumbling blocs” rather than “building blocs”
on the way to global free trade. We argue in this section that this is not necessarily the case.
Without GC superadditivity partial agre e m e n t sm a ys e r v ea ss t u m b l i n gb l o c sor building
blocs of global free trade. Which case applies depends on identiﬁable features of the world
economy.
We have developed two examples to illustrate these points (see Appendix B). In the ﬁrst
example we construct a world in which multilateral negotiations lead to free trade while
sequential negotiations lead to an FTA between two countries only. Nevertheless, the leader
prefers sequential negotiations. This is the sense in which the availability of partial agreements
may prevent the attainment of free trade. In this sort of world a rule that prohibits partial
agreements and forces the countries to engage in multilateral bargaining leads to global free
trade. In the second example we construct a world in which multilateral negotiations are
doomed to fail, i.e., they do not lead to global free trade. Yet sequential bargaining does lead
to global free trade, as the leader oﬀers an FTA ﬁrst to one follower country and afterwards
induces the second follower country to join. In this case, rules that restrict trade negotiations
to multilateral bargaining harm the prospects for global free trade.
In both examples we use aggregate proﬁts as a country’s payoﬀ. This political-objective
function arises in the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework when policy makers at-
tach zero weight to aggregate welfare and the ownership of sector-speciﬁc inputs is highly
concentrated.41 But we also provide a general analysis of stumbling bloc and building bloc
equilibria, which does not depend on the precise reasons for the failure of GC superadditivity.
And this analysis identiﬁes conditions under which stumbling bloc or building bloc equilibria
41Many studies use political-objective functions that attach diﬀerential weights to producer and consumer
surplus. See, for example, Laﬀont and Tirole’s (1993) analysis of economic regulation.
23are more likely to exist.
7.1 Stumbling Blocs
In Example 3 in Appendix B, there is an outside good y with constant marginal utility,
which serves as numeraire, and a product x with diminishing marginal utility; both are
traded internationally. The utility function of country j i sg i v e nb ye q u a t i o n( 3 ) .C o u n t r i e sa
and c import x in the initial equilibrium; both impose import tariﬀs; and the tariﬀ is higher
in a. Goods in sector y are freely traded. Every country seeks to maximize its proﬁts in
sector x.
Under these circumstances global free trade leads to a higher international price of x,
because the removal of tariﬀs raises import demand in countries a and c.B u t t h e h i k e i n
the international price is not enough to compensate producers in a and c for the removal of
the tariﬀs. As a result, proﬁts decline in countries a and c a n dr i s ei nc o u n t r yb.B u t t h e
increase in proﬁts in b more than compensates for the decline in proﬁts in a and c, leading
to a rise in aggregate world proﬁts. Therefore multilateral bargaining leads to the formation
of the grand coalition and to global free trade.
When c chooses sequential bargaining, it ﬁnds that its payoﬀ is highest when it approaches
country a ﬁrst. But an FTA between countries a and c leads to reduced protection, with the
price of x in a declining to the international price times the rate of protection in c.T h i s ,i n
turn, leads to an increase in aggregate world demand, thereby bidding up the international
price. As a result proﬁts rise in b and c and decline in a, because the rise in the international
price does not compensate producers in a for the fall in the rate of protection. The resulting
aggregate world proﬁts exceed aggregate world proﬁts under global free trade. In this event
country c’s payoﬀ is higher from forming a free trade area with a only than from forming
af r e et r a d ea r e aw i t ha and b. For this reason the equilibrium in the sequential bargaining
subgame consists of an FTA between a and c only. Country c prefers the outcome of the
sequential subgame to the outcome of the multilateral subgame. In this event sequential
bargaining is a stumbling bloc to worldwide free trade
The key features of this example, which are general requirements for a stumbling bloc
equilibrium in which c forms an FTA with a only, are the following:42 Multilateral bargaining
leads to the formation of the grand coalition, therefore W (abc) − W (a) − W (b) >W(c).
But, c prefers an FTA with a to multilateral bargaining, i.e., W (ac) − W (a) >W(abc) −
W (a)−W (b),a n dc has no incentive to attract b to the FTA with a,i . e . ,W (ac)−W (a) >
W (abc) − W (a) − WF (b). These conditions hold if and only if
W (ac)+m i n{W (b),W F (b)} >W(abc) >
X
j=a,b,c
W (j).
42A symmetric set of conditions can be formulated for the case in which c forms an FTA with b.
24Finally, c prefers to approach a ﬁrst and b second in sequential bargaining, which requires
W (ac) >W(a) − W (b)+m a x{W (bc),W(abc) − WF (a)}.
It is evident from these inequalities that a large payoﬀ W (ac) and large and positive coalition
externalities increase the likelihood that this sort of stumbling bloc equilibrium will emerge.
7.2 Building Blocs
In Example 4 in Appendix B, we also have two sectors, x and y, and preferences given by (3).
Both goods are traded internationally and there are no impediments to trade in y.C o u n t r i e s
a and b export x,a n dc has a tariﬀ on imports of x. Every country seeks to maximize proﬁts.
As in the previous example, free trade leads to an increase in c’s imports of x,t h e r e b y
bidding up its international price. As a result, proﬁts rise in countries a and b and decline
in c, because the rise in the international price does not compensate producers in c for the
removal of the tariﬀ. In this case, however, the fall in c’s proﬁts is larger than the rise in the
joint proﬁts of a and b. Therefore GC superadditivity fails, and c prefers the status quo to
oﬀers of an FTA that countries a and b will accept in the multilateral subgame. In this event
multilateral bargaining does not lead to global free trade.
In the sequential subgame, c prefers to approach a ﬁrst. An FTA between a and c leads
to enhanced protection; namely, the producer price in a rises to the tariﬀ rate in c times the
international price. This raises the aggregate world supply of x and depresses its price. The
lower international price hurts proﬁts in b, but it raises proﬁts in a, because the decline in
the international price is smaller than the tariﬀ rate in c. The new aggregate world proﬁts
are lower, however, than the proﬁts under free trade. For this reason c has an incentive to
bring b into the FTA. It follows that sequential bargaining leads to the formation of the grand
coalition and to global free trade. Moreover, the equilibrium payoﬀ to c exceeds c’s payoﬀ
from multilateral bargaining. Thus, in this example a restriction to multilateral bargaining
does not lead to global free trade, yet the choice of sequential bargaining, which c prefers,
leads to global free trade following a stepwise buildup of the FTA by adding a ﬁrst and then
b. In this case the FTA between a and c is a building bloc to worldwide free trade.
The key features of this example, which are general requirements for a building bloc
equilibrium in which c forms an FTA with a ﬁrst, are the following:43 First, country c prefers
the status quo to the grand coalition in multilateral bargaining, i.e., W (c) >W(abc) −
W (a)−W (b). Second, c prefers b to join its FTA with a,w h i c hr e q u i r e sW (abc)−W (a)−
WF (b) >W(ac) − W (a).T h i r d , c’s payoﬀ from sequential bargaining with a ﬁrst and b
second is higher than from multilateral bargaining, i.e., W (abc) − W (a) − WF (b) >W(c).
43A symmetric set of conditions can be formulated for the case in which c forms an FTA with b.
25Together these conditions hold if and only if
X
j=a,b,c
W (j) >W(abc) > max{W (ac),W(a)+W (c)} + WF (b).
Finally, c’s payoﬀ from approaching a ﬁrst in the sequential subgame is higher than its payoﬀ
from approaching b ﬁrst, or
W (abc) >W(a) − W (b)+m a x{W (bc),W(abc) − WF (a)} + WF (b).
Evidently, these conditions are more likely to be satisﬁed the smaller are W (ac) and W (bc)
and the more negative are the coalition externalities in b. In particular, no such building bloc
equilibrium exists when the coalition externalities are positive in the follower countries.
We conclude from this discussion that stumbling bloc equilibria are more likely to exist
the larger is the value of a bilateral FTA between c and one of the follower countries and
the larger are the coalition externalities in the follower countries. Building bloc equilibria
are more likely to exist the smaller are the values of bilateral FTAs between c a n de a c ho n e
of the follower countries and the more negative are the coalition externalities in one follower
country. Building bloc formation is furthered by an asymmetry in coalition externalities, i.e.,
a large negative externality in one follower country and a large positive externality in the
other. Without negative coalition externalities there are no building bloc equilibria. Naturally,
there can be equilibria that are neither stumbling nor building blocs of free trade.44
8 On Alternative Features of the Bargaining Protocol
A major aim of this paper has been to show that free trade can be attained when countries
may choose between multilateral and sequential bargaining, a choice that the WTO makes
available to its member states. What our Free Trade Proposition provides is a set of suﬃcient
conditions for the bargaining protocols and the objective functions of policy makers, i.e., GC
superadditivity, which guarantee this outcome. Naturally, free trade may not emerge as an
equilibrium outcome in other polities in which GC superadditivity fails, as discussed in the
previous section, or when countries use diﬀerent bargaining protocols.
As an example consider Saggi and Yildiz (2006). They construct an economy with recipro-
cal dumping a la Brander and Krugman (1983) in which there are two alternative bargaining
44It has been suggested to us that a more realistic formulation of the bargaining game would allow for a
reversion to sequential bargaining when multilateral negotiations fail. But in such a case the leader’s payoﬀ
under multilateral bargaining would always coincide with that under sequential bargaining, and the choice
between these two negotiation protocols would become indeterminate. Interestingly, however, stumbling and
building bloc equilibria would still arise under the conditions discussed in the main text.
26protocols, which they term FTA and No FTA. As in our model there are three countries a,
b and c, but no agenda setter and no transfers. In the FTA game, every country announces
which of the other two countries it wants to form a free trade area with; the announcement
can name one or both of the other countries. Then FTAs are formed among the countries
that have announced each other. If, for example, a includes b in its announcement and b
includes a, the two countries form an FTA. But if a includes b and b does not include a these
two countries do not form an FTA. Alternatively, in the No FTA game, which represents
multilateral bargaining, a country can only announce whether it is in favor or not of global
free trade. If all three countries are in favor, there is free trade. If at least one country
objects, the status quo prevails.
Evidently, these bargaining protocols diﬀer from ours, and they lead to multiple equilibria
even when the three countries are symmetric. Nevertheless, Saggi and Yildiz show that
free trade is the unique stable (coalition proof) equilibrium in the No FTA game but not
necessarily in the FTA game. In other words, there are conditions under which global free
trade as well as a free trade agreement between two countries only are stable equilibria in
the FTA game.45
Interestingly, in the symmetric case (or small deviations from symmetry) their objective
functions of the policy makers, which consist of aggregate welfare, are GC superadditive,
despite the presence of markups and reciprocal dumping (see their Lemma 1). Moreover,
their model exhibit negative coalition externalities (an FTA between any two countries hurts
the third). Under these circumstances we can apply the Free Trade Proposition to our
bargaining protocols. The implication is that when our bargaining protocols are applied to
their symmetric world, then free trade is the unique equilibrium outcome and it is achieved
via sequential bargaining.
As this discussion illustrates, details of the bargaining protocol can be important. For this
reason we discuss in the rest of this section two modiﬁcations of our sequential bargaining
protocol in order to explore how they aﬀect the equilibrium outcomes. One modiﬁcation
concerns the continuation game after a rejection. We assumed that when c, the agenda
setter, makes an oﬀer to one of the follower countries which the follower country rejects,
the game ends. In Section 8.1 we explore what happens if under these circumstances c can
proceed to make an oﬀer to the other follower country. In Section 8.2, we consider a diﬀerent
modiﬁcation. We assumed that c can commit to a payoﬀ when it makes an oﬀer to a follower
country, where this payoﬀ is independent of the ﬁnal outcome of the game. This hinges on
two issues: whether transfers from c to a follower country can be contingent on the outcome
of the game and whether c can make ﬁrm commitments. We shall examine the roles of these
45Saggi and Yildiz (2006) also analyze equilibria in asymmetric setups, in which two countries have identical
marginal costs while the third country has higher marginal costs. Their model also delivers building and
stumbling bloc equilibria.
27features in the bargaining protocol.
8.1 Rejection does not end the game
Consider a modiﬁcation of the sequential bargaining game in which a rejection in the ﬁrst
stage does not end the game. Instead, after a rejection, country c can proceed to make an
oﬀer to the next follower country. We call it the S2 game. The rest of the game is the same
as in the original formulation.
Does the Free Trade Proposition hold under these circumstances? The answer is No, yet
a number of important elements of this proposition, such as the role of coalition externali-
ties in the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, remain similar. A major
implication of this modiﬁcation is that GC superadditivity does not guarantee free trade
as the equilibrium outcome. It therefore dispels a possible conclusion from our Free Trade
Proposition that whenever the agenda setter can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the other
countries, then GC superadditivity is suﬃcient for free trade to be attained. In other words,
this ﬁnding suggests that the Free Trade Proposition requires more than GC superadditivity
and an agenda setter who can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers.
To understand the source of diﬀerences between S2 and the original bargaining protocol,
consider sequential bargaining in which the agenda setter approaches a ﬁrst and b second.
In the original speciﬁcation a rejection by a gave c the payoﬀ W (c). Under S2, a’s rejection
gives the agenda setter max{W (c),W(bc) − W (b)}. Why? Because after the rejection c
can make b as m a l lo ﬀer that b rejects, in which case c gets W (c).B u tc can also make b an
oﬀer that b accepts. Since W (b) is the smallest oﬀer that b accepts, this strategy gives c the
payoﬀ W (bc) − W (b).I fW (bc) − W (b) >W(c) then c prefers to form a coalition with b.
Next note that if W (bc) − W (b) >W(c) then the agenda setter has to make a an oﬀer
WF (a) in the ﬁrst stage for a to accept, because if a rejects the oﬀer then c will form a
coalition with b.B u t i f W (bc) − W (b) <W(c) then c is expected not to form a coalition
with b in case a rejects the oﬀer, in which case c has to oﬀer a the payoﬀ W (a) for a to
accept. It follows from this reasoning that if
max
z∈{a,b}
W (zc) − W (z) <W(c) (5)
then the agenda setter never forms an FTA in the second stage of the game, after its oﬀer
has been rejected in the ﬁrst stage. Under these circumstances our Free Trade Proposition
holds not only with our original sequential bargaining game but also with S2.
The question that arises is therefore whether there are circumstances in which sequential
bargaining under S2 and GC superadditivity can tempt the agenda setter to form a coalition
with one country only. We show in Appendix C that under S2 and GC superadditivity, free
28trade is not an equilibrium outcome if and only if the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
max
z∈{a,b}
W (zc) − W (z) >W(abc) − min{W (a)+W (b),W F (a)+WF (b)}, (6)
min
z∈{a,b}
W (zc) − W (z) >W(c). (7)
These conditions have an important implication (see Appendix C): they require the follower
country z∗,w h e r ez∗ =a r gm a x z∈{a,b} W (zc)−W (z), to have positive coalition externalities
and the other follower country to have negative coalition externalities. As a result free
trade is the equilibrium outcome when either both follower countries have positive coalition
externalities or both have negative coalition externalities.46
We also show in Appendix C that the agenda setter chooses multilateral bargaining when
both countries have positive coalition externalities and sequential bargaining when both coun-
tries have negative coalition externalities. In either one of these cases free trade results.
Moreover, the agenda setter chooses sequential bargaining when the aggregate coalition ex-
ternalities are negative, i.e., W (a)+W (b) >W F (a)+WF (b). The last condition is obviously
satisﬁed when the coalition externalities are negative in each one of these countries, but it
also can be satisﬁed when they are positive in one country and negative in the other. It fol-
lows that negative coalition externalities favor sequential bargaining while positive coalition
externalities favor multilateral bargaining. This is the sense in which coalition externalities
play a similar role in the S2 bargaining protocol and in the original bargaining protocol.
What explains the failure of free trade under S2 and GC superadditivity when conditions
(6) and (7) are satisﬁed? The intuition is as follows. The agenda setter’s payoﬀ after a
rejection of an oﬀer in the ﬁrst round is now aﬀected by what happens later in the game.
If one follower country has suﬃciently high positive coalition externalities and the other one
has suﬃciently high negative coalition externalities, then it may be too costly for c to induce
them both to join the coalition. When ﬁrst approaching the country with positive coalition
externalities, say country a, this country demands a high payoﬀ WF (a) in order to joint the
coalition, because it expects c to form a coalition with b when its oﬀer is rejected (this is
ensured by our necessary and suﬃcient conditions). On the other hand, when c approaches
the negative-externality country ﬁrst, which is country b, then once b accepts the oﬀer it
becomes expensive to attract country a to the coalition in the second stage because it has to
be paid again WF (a). So either way the cost of forming the grand coalition via sequential
bargaining is high, because the country with positive coalition externalities has to be paid
WF (a). In the original protocol this could be avoided by approaching country a with positive
46Note that in a world of reciprocal dumping we discussed above, where countries are symmetric, the
equilibrium outcome is sequential bargaining with free trade because this economic environment satisﬁes GC
superadditivity and the coalition externalities are negative. It follows that in this economic environment S2
and the original bargaining protocol yield the same outcomes.
29externalities ﬁrst paying it W (a) <W F (a), and then approaching country b with negative
externalities paying it WF (b) <W(b). Under S2 this is not possible, which makes the
formation of the grand coalition more costly.
It also follows that under S2, GC superadditivity and conditions (6)-(7), sequential bar-
gaining is a stumbling bloc on the way to free trade. Moreover, when conditions (6)-(7) are
not satisﬁed there is no equilibrium in this game in which sequential bargaining is a building
block on the way to free trade. This contrasts with our ﬁndings in the previous section, where
we examined lack of GC superadditivity; there sequential bargaining could be a stumbling
or a building block of free trade.
8.2 Lack of commitment and non-contingent transfers
We now go back to the original bargaining protocol in which the rejection of an oﬀer in the
ﬁrst stage of sequential bargaining ends the game. In this formulation we assumed that the
agenda setter can make oﬀers that secure ﬁxed payoﬀs to the follower countries. This is
without loss of generality in the last stage of the game, because at this stage the oﬀer and
outcome are both ﬁnal. It raises, however, the question of what is required to justify this
assumption in the ﬁrst stage.
For concreteness consider the case of negative coalition externalities in b and positive
coalition externalities in a,i . e . ,WF (b) <W(b) and WF (a) >W(a), and the sequential
subgame in which c approaches a ﬁrst and b second. Then, we have argued, the agenda
setter oﬀers a the payoﬀ W (a) which a accepts, followed by an oﬀer WF (b) to b which b
accepts. Under GC superadditivity this is an equilibrium of this subgame, giving c the payoﬀ
W (abc) − W (a) − WF (b). Evidently, it is assumed in this speciﬁcation that c can commit
in the ﬁrst stage of the game to secure payoﬀ W (a) for country a at the end of the game.
To understand what is involved, let Wz (abc) be the payoﬀ of country z in the absence of
transfers when the grand coalition forms, and let Wz (jk) for z = j,k be the payoﬀ of country
z in the absence of transfers when the coalition jk forms. In this event
X
z=a,b,c
Wz (abc)=W (abc),
X
z=j,k
Wz (jk)=W (jk).
Then there are two ways to support the equilibrium in the above described subgame. First,
country c can commit in stage one to a transfer Ta = W (a) − Wa (abc) to country a at the
end of the game if a joins the coalition and a grand coalition forms, and a transfer Ta =
W (a)−Wa (ac) if country b does not join the coalition. With these commitments country a
gets a payoﬀ W (a) when it agrees to joint the coalition independently of whether b joins. In
30response a accepts the oﬀer and c has the incentive to oﬀer b at r a n s f e rTb = WF (b)−Wb (abc)
for joining the coalition, which b accepts.
A second way to support the above equilibrium is by having the agenda setter oﬀer a
at r a n s f e rTa = W (a) − Wa (abc) in the ﬁrst stage of the game if a joints the coalition
coupled with a commitment by c to make an acceptable oﬀer to b in stage two. Under
the circumstances, a accepts the oﬀer and c has the incentive to oﬀer b at r a n s f e rTb =
WF (b) − Wb (abc) for joining the coalition, which b accepts. Note that in both cases the
strategies work because the agenda setter can make credible commitments; without credible
commitments a promise of W (a) in the ﬁrst stage is not credible. In addition note that, in
the ﬁrst case, a is oﬀered contingent transfers; one transfer when the grand coalition forms
and another transfer when it does not. In the second case the transfer can be made upfront,
because it is not contingent on the resulting coalition structure. But the commitment to
include country b in the coalition has to be credible for a to receive the payoﬀ it expects.
This discussion clariﬁes an important point: when the agenda setter can commit to
a course of action it can use non-contingent transfers to support our equilibrium.47 The
remaining issue we discuss in this section is what happens when contingent transfers are not
available and the agenda setter has no ability to commit to a course of action. As is well
known, in such circumstances c may be tempted to behave opportunistically, and the question
becomes what are the consequences of such opportunistic behavior.
To this end we now consider a modiﬁed version of the sequential subgame, call it S3.
Under this protocol the agenda setter has no commitment power. As a result it oﬀers non-
contingent transfers and it cannot commit in stage one to a course of action in the second
stage. The rest of the game is the same as before.
Let us reconsider the sequential subgame a,b under S3 when country b has negative
coalition externalities and country a has positive coalition externalities. To support the
equilibrium described above the agenda setter has to oﬀer a the non-contingent transfer
Ta = W (a)−Wa (abc).I fa accepts the oﬀer then c has an incentive to expand the coalition
to include b i fa n do n l yi f
W (abc) − W (ac) − WF (b) ≥ Wa (abc) − Wa (ac). (8)
In other words, GC superadditivity is no longer suﬃcient to ensure c’s desire to expand the
free trade area. Why? Because if c does not expand the FTA it gets a payoﬀ Wc (ac)−Ta and if
it expands the FTA it gets a payoﬀ Wc (abc)−Ta−Tb. Therefore c is willing to include b in the
coalition if and only if Wc (abc)−Tb ≥ Wc (ac). But since Tb = WF (b)−Wb (abc),w eo b t a i n
47We did not specify the payoﬀ to c when b rejects the oﬀer to joint the coalition after c committed to a to
bring b into the coalition. The reason is that this payoﬀ does not matter because c makes b a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer and b has the incentive to accept every oﬀer Tb ≥ WF (b) − Wb (abc).
31(8). In case (8) does not hold, which by GC superadditivity implies Wa (abc) >W a (ac),t h e
agenda setter does not want to expand the free trade area. Then a’s payoﬀ is
Wa (ac)+Ta = W (a)+Wc (ac) − Wc (abc) <W(a).
Anticipating this outcome a rejects the non-contingent transfer Ta = W (a) − Wa (abc) and
our equilibrium cannot be supported. In short, when Wa (abc) is much larger than Wa (ac)
promises of c to a to bring country b into the coalition are not credible.
It follows from this discussion that when (8) holds and a similar condition holds for
country b then our Free Trade Proposition remains valid under S3, and when these two
conditions on preferences are not satisﬁed other equilibrium outcomes are possible. We show
in Appendix C that when the coalition externalities are positive in both follower countries
and GC superadditivity holds then multilateral bargaining is the equilibrium outcome under
S3 and free trade prevails. This is similar to our Free Trade Proposition. It follows that in
this case too negative coalition externalities are needed for sequential bargaining to be an
equilibrium outcome. But unlike the original bargaining protocol, under S3 negative coalition
externalities may result in sequential bargaining with free trade or sequential bargaining with
a partial coalition.
9 Concluding Comments
We have developed a dynamic model of bargaining with transferable utility in order to eval-
uate the relative merits of multilateral and sequential trade negotiations. An evaluation of
this sort is needed to assess the articles of agreement of the WTO. We believe that an explicit
modelling of the bargaining process is necessary for this purpose. Although we recognize the
limitations of our model, which may be too simple for the task at hand, we also feel that
it provides valuable insights into these issues. In particular, it identiﬁes superadditivity and
coalition externalities in the structure of payoﬀs as important determinants of the relative
performance of these bargaining protocols. True, the nature of these inﬂuences may vary with
the bargaining procedure, but we believe that superadditivity and coalition externalities are
important in every realistic bargaining procedure.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: First, in the absence of coalition exter-
nalities and under GC superadditivity global free trade is the unique equilibrium outcome,
independently of whether preferential trade agreements are allowed or forbidden. This re-
sult extends to allowing for positive or negative coalition externalities under our assumptions
that: (i) a rejection in the ﬁrst stage under sequential bargaining prevents the leader country
from making other oﬀers in the second stage; (ii) the leader country can commit to a given
course of action or to contingent transfers in advance. Therefore, although we have discussed
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customs unions, economic unions, and other forms of trade liberalization. This follows from
the fact that the leading country is a residual claimant on the surplus from global free trade,
and that it has the ability to compensate other countries for the abandoning of suboptimal
agreements.
Second, under GC superadditivity the leading country strictly prefers sequential bargain-
ing when coalition externalities are negative in at least one follower country. The reason is
that in this case the leading country gains more from ﬁrst forming an FTA with the country
that has the higher coalition externalities and then expanding the free trade area to encom-
pass all countries, than from making simultaneous oﬀers to all follower countries. The key
is that once an FTA exists, it is cheap to “buy” a country with negative coalition exter-
nalities. Conversely, the leading country prefers multilateral bargaining when the coalition
externalities of the follower countries are positive, because then sequential bargaining makes
it expensive to “buy” outside countries.
Third, when payoﬀs are not GC superadditive, global free trade may not occur in equilib-
rium. We showed that in this event preferential trade agreements facilitate the achievement
of global free trade when coalition externalities are negative, and hamper it when coalition
externalities are positive. Evidently, the structure of coalition externalities is an important
determinant of which bargaining protocol secures global free trade.
We illustrated these conclusions with a simple competitive model of international trade
in which global free trade is Pareto-eﬃcient. The model clariﬁes the sources of coalition
externalities. They are related to trade structure and the structure of protection. They also
depend on features of demand and supply in each country. A free-trade agreement removes
tariﬀs on trade between members of the FTA, whereas FTA members maintain their original
rates of protection vis à vis outside countries. In this model, coalition externalities stem from
the impact of FTAs on world prices, which aﬀect the welfare or political objectives of the
trading partners. Coalition externalities on welfare-maximizing nonmember countries tend to
be negative when an FTA reduces the prices of their exportables, and positive when an FTA
reduces the prices of their importables. If every country’s negotiators maximize aggregate
welfare and trade taxes are the only distortions, then GC superadditivity holds and global
free trade is attained in equilibrium. If, however, special interests induce country negotiators
to maximize a politically-motivated objective function, then GC superadditivity may fail to
hold and preferential trade agreements can be either building blocs or stumbling blocs to free
trade, as explained above.
Finally, we showed how stumbling blocs can also emerge when; (i) following a rejection
in the ﬁrst stage, the agenda setter can still make an oﬀer in the second stage, or; (ii) the
agenda setter cannot commit to a ﬁxed payoﬀ to the ﬁrst country which is independent of
what happens in the second stage. Even in those cases we found, however, that negative
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multilateral bargaining.
Our model of trade negotiations has special attributes, yet our methodology of using
dynamic bargaining models of coalition formation to study trade negotiations can be explored
and pursued in several interesting directions. First, we have examined cases in which the
agenda setter is predetermined. Yet agenda setting power can be related to a country’s
characteristics, such as it economic size, the level of its technology, ﬁnancial development and
the like. Under these circumstances the characteristics of the leader will be correlated with
the coalition externalities that its FTA imposes on nonmember countries. Second, it would
be interesting to study the lack of GC superadditivity that emanates from diﬀerent sources.
Alternative sources of nonadditivity can be lack of competition, distortions in labor markets,
or institutional constraints on economic transactions. It would be interesting to understand
how these diﬀerent reasons for lack of superadditivity impact the building and stumbling bloc
eﬀects of preferential trade agreements. Third, our model disregards geography. Many of the
preferential trade agreements are regional, however. What features of geography drive this
bias? And do these features aﬀect the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining?
F o u r t h ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h ep l a y e r s ’p a y o ﬀ functions are common knowledge. A more
realistic formulation might involve the agenda setter facing some level of uncertainty about
the follower countries’ payoﬀ functions. We believe that such asymmetric information might
inﬂuence our results in interesting ways.48
Finally, our analysis abstracts from issues related to bargaining costs. Typically, these
costs should depend upon whether negotiations take place sequentially or multilaterally. Yet
it is not obvious which of the two would be larger. One may argue that multilateral negoti-
ations skip bargaining stages and thus reduce the delay in reaching free trade. On the other
hand, bargaining costs may increase with the number of agents simultaneously involved in
the bargaining, which plays against multilateral bargaining. Future research will clarify how
these considerations interact with coalition externalities and properties of objective functions
in shaping the outcomes of trade negotiations.
48Indeed, we have worked out an example in which the leader views the follower countries’ payoﬀsa s
uniformly distributed random variables. We found that, with this type of asymmetric information, negative
externalities may promote the emergence of stumbling bloc equilibria.
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We discuss in this appendix three generalizations and modiﬁcations of the Free Trade Proposition.
Many countries
We ﬁrst generalize the bargaining model to a world of many countries. Let country c be the
agenda setter, and assume that there are N ≥ 2 follower countries indexed by c1,c 2,...,cN.T h es e t
of all countries, the grand coalition, is denoted by CG = {c,c1,c 2,...,cN}, and the set of all follower
c o u n t r i e si sd e n o t e db yCO = {c1,c 2,...,cN}.
The game is played as follows. In stage one country c chooses to make an oﬀer to any subset
S1 ⊂ CO of the follower countries. The oﬀer consists of a coalition CF,1 = c∪S1, i.e., an FTA among
all the countries in CF,1, and payoﬀs P (j) for all j ∈ S1.I f t h e o ﬀer is rejected by at least one
country in CF,1 the game ends. If, however, all countries accept the oﬀer, the game moves to the
second stage. In the second stage c makes an oﬀer to a subset S2 of the remaining follower countries,
i.e., S2 ⊂ CO\S1.T h eo ﬀer consists of a coalition CF,2 = CF,1 ∪ S2 and payoﬀs P (j) for all j ∈ S2.
If the oﬀer is rejected by at least one country, the game ends. Otherwise the game continues to the
third round. More generally, if c’s oﬀers where not rejected in the ﬁrst t − 1 rounds, then in round t
country c makes an oﬀer to a subset St ⊂ CO\ ∪
t−1
i=1 Si of the follower countries, which consists of a
coalition CF,t = CF,t−1 ∪ St and payoﬀs P (j) for all j ∈ St. The game ends at some stage T when
either c’s oﬀer is rejected or the grand coalition forms, i.e., CF,T = CG. It is self-evident that this
game collapses to our three-country game when N =2 .I np a r t i c u l a r ,w h e nc makes a simultaneous
oﬀer to all follower countries we say that c has chosen multilateral bargaining. And when c chooses
to follow any other branch of the game tree, we say that c has chosen sequential bargaining.
We now need a more general notion of grand-coalition superadditivity, which we generalize as fol-
lows: GC superadditivity exists if v(CG;hCGi) >
P
C∈Γ v (C;Γ) for every Γ 6= hCGi.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
GC superadditivity ensures that the aggregate payoﬀ of the grand coalition exceeds the aggregate
payoﬀ of every other coalition structure.
We now show that GC superadditivity implies that the grand coalition forms in equilibrium and
global free trade emerges. Suppose to the contrary that Γ = hCF,T,{h1},{h2},...,{hM}i is the
equilibrium partition in this bargaining game, where CF,T 6= CG and h1,h 2,...,h M are the countries
not included in the FTA. Let P (j;Γ) be j’s payoﬀ in this equilibrium.
Now suppose that instead of making an oﬀer that is rejected in stage T,c o u n t r yc invites countries
h1,h 2,...,hM to join the FTA by oﬀering hi the payoﬀ P (hi;Γ)=v({hi};Γ), i =1 ,2,...,M.T h i s
oﬀer is accepted by every country. As a result, c’s payoﬀ is
v(CG;hCGi) −
M X
i=1
v({hi};Γ) −
X
j∈CF,T,j6=c
P (j;Γ).
But
P
j∈CF,T P (j;Γ)=v (CF,T;Γ). Therefore c’s payoﬀ equals
P (c;Γ)+v(CG;hCGi) − v(CF;Γ) −
M X
i=1
v({hi};Γ),
35and GC superadditivity implies that this payoﬀ exceeds P (c;Γ). Therefore Γ is not an equilibrium
partition. Thus, the grand coalition forms in equilibrium.
Additional leaders
In the previous game a rejection of an oﬀer ended the game. We now modify the game and assume
i n s t e a dt h a tw h e na no ﬀer is rejected the agenda-setting power shifts to another country. In particular,
and without loss of generality, suppose that c is the ﬁrst leader whereas countries c1,c 2,...,cN are the
leaders in the natural order of their subscript. This ordering means the following: When an oﬀer of
country c is rejected, where an oﬀer consists of an invitation to a subset of follower countries to join
c’s FTA and payoﬀs to these countries, the agenda-setting role shifts to country ci with the lowest
index i among the countries that are not already members of c’s FTA. From this point on, the new
agenda-setter, say country ˆ c1, is the leader until its oﬀer is rejected. ˆ c1 is allowed to make oﬀers to
follower countries that are not members of c’s FTA. As in the case of country c,a no ﬀer consists
of an invitation to a subset of these countries to join ˆ c1’s FTA, including payoﬀs to these countries.
When ˆ c1’s oﬀer is rejected the leadership role shifts to the lowest index country ci that is in neither
the FTA formed by c nor by ˆ c1,s a yc o u n t r yˆ c2. And so on. The game ends when either the last
free-standing follower receives agenda-setting power or it joins the FTA formed by the country that
gained agenda-setting power in the previous round.
We argue that with GC superadditivity the grand coalition forms in the equilibrium of this game
and global free trade emerges. To prove the argument, assume to the contrary that the equilibrium
partition is Γ = hCc,C 1,...,CLi 6= hCGi,w h e r eCc is the coalition formed by country c and Ci is the
coalition formed by country ˆ ci, i =1 ,2,...,L. That is, there is one free trade area Cc formed by c,
possibly consisting of country c only, and L free trade areas Ci formed by countries ˆ ci, i =1 ,2,...,L,
with Ci possibly consisting of country ˆ ci only. Let P (j;Γ) be the payoﬀ of country j in this equilibrium.
Now suppose that after forming Cc country c invites all countries not in Cc to join its FTA, oﬀering
payoﬀs P (j;Γ) to all j/ ∈ Cc.I fΓ is a subgame perfect equilibrium, then these countries accept the
oﬀer. As a result c’s payoﬀ is
v(CG;hCGi) −
L X
i=1
X
j∈Ci
P (j;Γ) −
X
j∈Cc,j6=c
P (j;Γ).
Note, however, that
PL
i=1
P
j∈Ci P (j;Γ)=
PL
i=1 v(Ci;Γ) and
P
j∈Cc P (j;Γ)=v(Cc;Γ). Therefore
c’s payoﬀ can be expressed as
P (c;Γ)+v (CG;hCGi) −
L X
i=1
v(Ci;Γ) − v(Cc;Γ).
GC superadditivity implies, however, that this payoﬀ exceeds P (c;Γ). Therefore Γ is not an equi-
librium partition. It follows that the grand coalition forms in equilibrium and leads to global free
trade.
Random leaders
In the previous version of the bargaining game the order in which countries gain agenda-setting
power is predetermined. An alternative is to assign agenda-setting power randomly to one of the
36countries that do not belong to an existing coalition. Thus, for example, if at stage t the partition is
Γt = hCc,C 1,...,CL,{h1},{h2},...,{hM}i a n da no ﬀer of the agenda-setter ˆ cL is rejected, then one
of the countries j ∈ {h1,h 2,...,hM} becomes the leader, and the leadership is determined by a draw
from some distribution function Ht over {h1,h 2,...,h M}. The distribution function Ht can be time
dependent and it obviously depends on the set of eligible countries {h1,h 2,...,hM} at stage t.T h e
other details of the game are the same as above. We argue that in this case too the grand coalition
forms in equilibrium and worldwide free trade occurs when the payoﬀs are GC superadditive.49
Suppose to the contrary, that the equilibrium partition is random, with Γk =
­
Cc,Ck
1,...,Ck
Lk
®
for k =1 ,2,...,K having positive probability, and Γk 6= hCGi for some k.N o t et h a tCc is the same
in all these partitions, because the uncertainty arises only after c’s oﬀer is rejected, and it stems
from uncertainty regarding the identity of future agenda-setters. In this event the expected payoﬀ of
country j is P (j;Cc)=EP
¡
j;Γk¢
,w h e r eE is the expectations operator over Γk.
Now consider the following strategy of country c at stage t, after it has formed the coalition Cc in
stage t − 1.C o u n t r yc invites all countries not in Cc to join the FTA and oﬀers each one the payoﬀ
P (j;Cc), for all j/ ∈ Cc. The payoﬀst oc o u n t r i e si nCc remain P (j;Cc) for j ∈ Cc\c. Under these
circumstances the countries not in Cc accept the oﬀer while the follower countries in Cc obtain the
payoﬀ that they were promised. The resulting payoﬀ to country c is
v(CG;hCGi) −
X
j∈CG\c
P (j;Cc).
Note, however, that
X
j∈CG
P (j;Cc)=E
X
j∈CG
P
¡
j;Γk¢
= E
⎡
⎣v
¡
Cc;Γk¢
+
Lk X
i=1
X
j∈Ck
i
v
¡
Ck
i ;Γk¢
⎤
⎦.
Therefore, by taking expectations over Γk, c’s payoﬀ can be expressed as
P (c;Cc)+v(CG;hCGi) − E
⎡
⎣v
¡
Cc;Γk¢
+
Lk X
i=1
X
j∈Ci
v
¡
Ck
i ;Γk¢
⎤
⎦.
GC superadditivity implies, however, that
v (CG;hCGi) − v
¡
Cc;Γk¢
−
Lk X
i=1
X
j∈Ci
v
¡
Ck
i ;Γk¢
> 0
for every k =1 ,2,...,K. Therefore c’s payoﬀ under the proposed strategy exceeds P (c;Cc) and Γk / ∈
hCGi cannot have positive probability in equilibrium. It follows that the grand coalition forms with
probability 1, leading to free trade. Naturally, the game with random agenda setters is a generalization
of the game with predetermined agenda-setters and therefore this result is a generalization of the result
for the previous subsection.
49Gomes (2003) provides a general analysis of a coalition-formation game with randomly assigned agenda-
setting power. His model is somewhat diﬀerent but closely akin to ours. He shows that the grand coalition
forms with probability 1 when GC superadditivity holds and the future is not discounted.
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In this appendix we provide the details corresponding to Examples 3 and 4 in the main text.
Example 3: Stumbling Blocs
Assume that uj (x) is quadratic, implying the demand functions
Ca (q)=4− q,
Cb (q)=3− q,
Cc (q)=8− q,
where q is a price. We also assume that the proﬁt functions Πj (q) are quadratic, given by
Πa (q)=
5
4
q,
Πb (q)=
5
2
q +
1
2
q2,
Πc (q)=
17
4
q +
1
2
q2.
These proﬁt functions yield the supply functions
Xa (q)=
5
4
,
Xb (q)=
5
2
+ q,
Xc (q)=
17
4
+ q.
In the initial equilibrium, countries a and c import x while b exports it. The tariﬀ rates are τa =2 ,
τb =1and τc =1 .5. Under these circumstances the equilibrium international price of x, pn,c a nb e
solved from the market clearing condition
X
j=a,b,c
Cj (τjpn)=
X
j=a,b,c
Xj (τjpn).
This yields pn =1 . In addition, countries maximize proﬁts. Therefore
W (a)=Πa (τapn)=2 .5,
W (b)=Πb (τbpn)=3 ,
W (c)=Πc (τcpn)=7 .5.
Next note that under free trade the equilibrium international price p(abc) is solved from the
38market clearing condition X
j=a,b,c
Cj [p(abc)] =
X
j=a,b,c
Xj [p(abc)],
which yields p(abc)=1 .4. Therefore the payoﬀ of the grand coalition is
W (abc)=
X
j=a,b,c
Πj [p(abc)] = 13.16.
It follows that in the multilateral bargaining subgame country c’s payoﬀ from oﬀering the follower
countries P (j)=W (j), j = a,b,i s
Pmulti (c)=W (abc) − W (a) − W (b)=7 .66.
This payoﬀ exceeds W (c)=7 .5. Therefore in this subgame the grand coalition forms, leading to
global free trade.
Now consider sequential bargaining, and suppose that c approaches a ﬁrst. The tariﬀ rate is higher
in c than in a, therefore, as we have seen in Section 3, this can lead to enhanced or reduced protection.
But in this example Ca (τcpn)−Xa (τcpn) <X c (τcpn). Therefore, an FTA between a and c leads to
reduced protection, i.e., the price in a declines from τa times the international price to τc times the
international price. As a result, the new equilibrium international price p(ac) is the solution to the
market clearing condition
X
j=a,c
Cj [τcp(ac)] + Cb [τbp(ac)] =
X
j=a,c
Xj [τcp(ac)] + Xb [τbp(ac)],
which is p(ac)=1 4 /13. Under these circumstances the joint payoﬀ of a and c is
W (ac)=
X
j=a,c
Πj [τcp(ac)] = 10.189
whereas the payoﬀ of b is
WF (b)=Πb [τbp(ac)] = 3.2722.
It follows that
W (abc) − W (ac) − WF (b)=−0.3012 < 0.
That is, GC superadditivity does not hold and c has no incentive to oﬀer b the payoﬀ P (b)=WF (b)
in order to induce b to join the FTA. As a result c’s payoﬀ from forming an FTA with a only, which
is the highest payoﬀ from sequential bargaining when c approaches a ﬁrst, is
Pa,b (c)=W (ac) − W (a)=7 .6893.
Note that this payoﬀ exceeds W (c)=7 .5 as well as Pmulti (c)=W (abc) − W (a) − W (b)=7 .66.
Therefore sequential bargaining dominates multilateral bargaining from the point of view of country
c.
It remains to examine sequential bargaining in which c approaches country b ﬁrst. Note that
Cc (pn) − Xc (pn) <X b (pn). Therefore an FTA between b and c leads to reduced protection. In this
39event the international price p(bc) is determined by the market clearing condition
X
j=b,c
Cj [p(bc)] + Ca [τap(bc)] =
X
j=b,c
Xj [p(bc)] + Xa [τap(bc)],
which yields p(bc)=7 /6. As a result, the joint payoﬀ of b and c is
W (bc)=
X
j=b,c
Πj [p(bc)] = 9.2361
and a’s payoﬀ is
WF (a)=Πa [τap(bc)] = 2.9167.
It follows that
W (abc) − W (bc) − WF (a)=1 .0072 > 0,
which implies that once c h a sf o r m e da nF T Aw i t hb,c o u n t r yc gains by oﬀering a ap a y o ﬀ of
P (a)=WF (a) in order to induce a to join the FTA. That is, if c approaches b ﬁrst, then the subgame
perfect equilibrium leads to global free trade. But note that under these circumstances c’s payoﬀ is
Pb,a (c)=W (abc) − W (b) − WF (a)=7 .2433,
and this payoﬀ is smaller than the payoﬀ Pa,b (c)=7 .6893 from making a an oﬀer ﬁrst. Therefore,
despite the fact that one branch of the sequential bargaining subgame leads to worldwide free trade, the
leader prefers the other branch, that leads to a free trade agreement between a and c only. Moreover,
as we have seen above, the leader also prefers the FTA between a and c only to the global free trade
outcome under multilateral bargaining. Therefore c chooses sequential bargaining and it approaches a
ﬁrst. Evidently, in this situation sequential bargaining produces a stumbling bloc to global free trade.
Example 4: Building Blocs
Now the demand functions are
Ca (q)=1− 2q,
Cb (q)=1 5− 2q,
Cc (q)=8− q,
and the proﬁt functions are
Πa (q)=2 q + q2,
Πb (q)=1 5 q +
1
2
q2,
Πc (q)=3 q.
As a result, the supply functions are
Xa (q)=2+2 q,
Xb (q)=1 5+q,
40Xc (q)=3 .
In the initial equilibrium, country c imports x from both a and b,a n dτa =1 , τb =1 , τc =1 .5.I n
t h i se v e n tm a r k e tc l e a r i n gr e q u i r e s
X
j=a,b,c
Cj (τjpn)=
X
j=a,b,c
Xj (τjpn),
yielding the equilibrium price pn =0 .47059. Every country maximizes proﬁts. Therefore
W (a)=Πa (τapn)=1 .1626,
W (b)=Πb (τbpn)=7 .1696,
W (c)=Πc (τcpn)=2 .1177.
Under free trade the equilibrium international price p(abc) is solved from the market clearing
condition X
j=a,b,c
Cj [p(abc)] =
X
j=a,b,c
Xj [p(abc)],
which yields p(abc)=1 /2. Therefore the payoﬀ of the grand coalition is
W (abc)=
X
j=a,b,c
Πj [p(abc)] = 10.375.
It follows that in the multilateral bargaining subgame country c’s payoﬀ from oﬀering the follower
countries P (j)=W (j), j = a,b,i s
W (abc) − W (a) − W (b)=2 .0428,
which falls short of W (c)=2 .1177. Under these circumstances c’s payoﬀ from multilateral bargaining
is W (c),a n dt h i sp a y o ﬀ is attained by making an oﬀer that is rejected by either a or b.
Next consider sequential bargaining. If c makes the ﬁrst oﬀer to a and a accepts it, then the FTA
between a and c leads to enhanced protection, because Cc (τcpn) − Xc (τcpn) >X a (τcpn).I n t h i s
event the international price p(ac) is determined by the market clearing condition
X
j=a,b,c
Cj [τjp(ac)] =
X
j=a,c
Xj [τcp(ac)] + Xb [τbp(ac)],
which is p(ac)=0 .42105. Under these circumstances the joint payoﬀ of a and c is
W (ac)=
X
j=a,c
Πj [τcp(ac)] = 3.5568
whereas the payoﬀ of b is
WF (b)=Πb [τbp(ac)] = 6.4044.
41It follows that
W (abc) − W (ac) − WF (b)=0 .41385 > 0.
In this event c has the incentive to expand the FTA to include b.T h e r e f o r e ,i fc approaches a ﬁrst,
then the grand coalition forms, leading to global free trade. The leader’s payoﬀ is then
Pa,b (c)=W (abc) − W (a) − WF (b)=2 .808.
This payoﬀ exceeds W (c)=2 .1177. Therefore c prefers sequential to multilateral bargaining.
It remains to examine whether in sequential bargaining c prefers to approach a ﬁrst or b.I f c
approaches b ﬁrst and they form an FTA, this leads to reduced protection, because Cc (pn)−Xc (pn) <
Xa (pn). Therefore this FTA leads to global free trade, because it reduces c’s price to the international
price. In this event the international price p(bc) is equal to p(abc). Therefore, global free trade is
also achieved on this branch of the sequential subgame. However, in this case c’s payoﬀ is
Pb,a (c)=W (abc) − W (b) − WF (a)=2 .0428.
And since Pb,a (c)=2 .0428 <P a,b (c)=2 .808,c o u n t r yc prefers to approach a ﬁrst. In the subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game an FTA between a and c is a building bloc to free trade; this FTA
is expanded in the second stage to include country b. In this example sequential bargaining leads to
global free trade while multilateral bargaining does not.
Appendix C
In this Appendix we provide formal proofs of the statements in Sections 8.1 and 8.2.
R e j e c t i o nd o e sn o te n dt h eg a m e
Let us start with a derivation of the results under the bargaining protocol we have labelled S2. It is
useful to start by expressing the payoﬀ that the leader country c obtains under alternative strategies.
This is illustrated in Table C.1. The derivation of these payoﬀs is straightforward given the discussion
in the main text.50 The term “skip” in the table refers to a situation in which country c makes a low
enough oﬀer to the ﬁrst country being approached to ensure that this oﬀer is rejected.
Failure of global free trade corresponds to cases in which the largest payoﬀ in sequential bargaining
is either W (ac)−W (a) or W (bc)−W (b). We can further narrow our search for necessary conditions
for free trade to fail by noting that the leader will never make an acceptable oﬀer in the ﬁrst stage
and choose not to attract the third country. This follows directly from GC superadditivity as proved
in Section 5.
50We are not considering the case in which the leader makes unacceptable oﬀers to both countries because
this is strictly dominated by multilateral bargaining (given GC superadditivity).
42Table C.1: Country c’s payoﬀs in the S2 game
Multilateral Bargaining W (abc) − W (a) − W (b)
Sequential Bargaining a,b
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
W (ac) − W (a) if attracts a but not b
W (bc) − W (b) if “skips” a and attracts b
W (abc) − W (a) − WF (b) if attracts both and W (bc) − W (b) <W(c)
W (abc) − WF (a) − WF (b) if attracts both and W (bc) − W (b) >W(c)
Sequential Bargaining b,a
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
W (bc) − W (b) if attracts b but not a
W (ac) − W (a) if “skips” b and attracts a
W (abc) − WF (a) − W (b) if attracts both and W (ac) − W (a) <W(c)
W (abc) − WF (a) − WF (b) if attracts both and W (ac) − W (a) >W(c)
Next note that if W (ac) − W (a) <W(c),c o u n t r yc will never want to skip b and later attract
a, but it will not want to skip a and later attract b either because by doing so it would obtain
W (bc) − W (b), which is (by GC superadditivity) less than W (abc) − WF (a) − W (b),ap a y o ﬀ c can
obtain by ﬁrst attracting b and later a (see Table C.1). By similar reasoning we can conclude that a
failure of free trade is inconsistent with W (bc)−W (b) <W(c). In sum, a failure of free trade requires
condition (7) in the main text. It thus follows that in searching for further necessary conditions for
free trade to fail, we can abstract from the ﬁrst and third rows of each sequential bargaining branch
in Table C.1. It then becomes clear that a failure of free trade can only occur if W (bc) − W (b) or
W (ac) − W (a) are larger than max{W (abc) − W (a) − W (b),W(abc) − WF (a) − WF (b)}, which
we can express as condition (6) in the main text. We have proved that (6) and (7) are both necessary
conditions for free trade to fail. But note also that if these two conditions are met, then it is necessarily
the case that free trade will fail in equilibrium as the leader will “skip” one country and attract the
third one. Hence, conditions (6) and (7) are necessary and suﬃcient for free trade to fail.
We can next use Table C.1 to further characterize the equilibrium process of coalition formation
under bargaining protocol S2. Consider ﬁrst the case in which externalities are negative in both
countries. It is easy to verify that in such cases (6) cannot hold and global free trade will be attained.
This is because when WF (z) <W(z) for z = a,b, condition (6) reads
W (z∗c) − W (z∗) >W(abc) − WF (z∗) − WF (q),
where z∗ =a r gm a x z∈{a,b} {W (zc) − W (z)} and q = {a,b}−{z∗}. But this cannot possibly hold given
GC superadditivity (W (abc) − W (z∗c) − WF (q) > 0) and negative externalities in z∗ (WF (z∗) <
W (z∗)). Hence, in searching for the equilibrium with negative externalities in both countries, we
can ignore the payoﬀs in the Table C.1 associated with a failure of global free trade. As a result,
inspection of the table indicates that no matter whether (7) holds or not, country c can obtain a
strictly higher payoﬀ under some form of sequential bargaining than under multilateral bargaining
(since WF (z) <W(z) for z = a,b).
In a similar fashion, we can show that global free trade will be attained when both countries have
positive externalities, and that the leader will strictly prefer multilateral bargaining in such cases. To
see this, note that with positive externalities, (6) can be written as
W (z∗c) − W (z∗) >W(abc) − W (z∗) − W (q),
43but again this cannot possibly hold under GC superadditivity (W (abc)−W (z∗c)−WF (q) > 0)a n d
positive externalities in q (WF (q) >W(q)). Focusing on the relevant payoﬀs in Table C.1, it is clear
that multilateral bargaining is then the preferred strategy for the leader country.
We have thus shown that free trade will prevail unless externalities are positive in one country
and negative in the other. Using the above notation, we can further show that, when free trade fails,
the country with positive externalities has to be z∗. In particular, note that
W (z∗c) − W (z∗) >W(abc) − W (z∗) − W (q)
is inconsistent with GC superadditivity and W (q) <W F (q),w h i l e
W (z∗c) − W (z∗) >W(abc) − WF (z∗) − WF (q),
is inconsistent with GC superadditivity and W (z∗) >W F (z∗). So for condition (6) to hold with
externalities of opposite sign in each follower country, we must have W (q) >W F (q) and W (z∗) <
WF (z∗).
The main diﬀerence between these results and those in the Free Trade Proposition in Section 5
is that negative coalition externalities in one country are no longer suﬃcient to lead to sequential
bargaining. To see this it suﬃces to produce an example. So consider the case in which (i) WF (a)+
WF (b) >W(a)+W (b); (ii) WF (a) − W (a) > 0 >W F (b) − W (b); and (iii) W (bc) − W (b) >
W (c) >W(ac) − W (a). In such cases, ruling out the obvious dominated strategies in Table C.1, we
ﬁnd that multilateral bargaining is chosen despite WF (b) <W(b) because
W (abc) − W (a) − W (b) >W(abc) − WF (a) − W (b) >W(bc) − W (b)
and
W (abc) − W (a) − W (b) >W(abc) − WF (a) − WF (b),
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d( i ) - ( i i i )a sw e l la sG Cs u p e r a d d i t i v i t y .
Even though one negative externality is not suﬃcient to induce the leader to choose sequential
bargaining, it is still the case that a suﬃciently negative externality is suﬃcient to lead to sequential
bargaining. In particular, provided that WF (a)+WF (b) <W(a)+W (b), it is clear from inspection
of Table C.1, that the leader is strictly better of by choosing some form of sequential bargaining.
Lack of commitment and non-contingent transfers
We next provide a formal proof of the claim in the main text of Section 8.2 that, even in the absence
of commitment, multilateral bargaining is the preferred strategy of the leader whenever externalities
are positive in both countries.
To show this, it suﬃces to focus on situations in which global free trade is not attained (when it is,
the analysis is analogous to that in the Free Trade Proposition). So consider the sequential subgame
a,b in which country c ﬁnds it optimal to only attract a. Then for this strategy to be preferred to
multilateral bargaining we need
W (ac) − W (a) >W(abc) − W (a) − W (b),
44which we can alternatively write as
W (b) − WF (b) >W(abc) − W (ac) − WF (b).
Given GC superadditivity, this condition can only hold if there are negative externalities in b. Similarly,
we can show that a failure of free trade in the sequential subgame b,a can occur only if there are
negative externalities in a, i.e., W (a) − WF (a). We therefore conclude that whenever externalities
are positive in both countries, multilateral bargaining is the optimal strategy for the leader country.
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